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INTERBASIN TRANSFERS:
NEBRASKA LAW AND LEGEND
JarretC. Oeltjen*, Richard S. Harnsberger**,and
Ralph T.Fischer***
PREFACE
The 1967 Nebraska Legislature directed the Nebraska Soil and
Water Conservation Commission to "plan, develop, and encourage
the implementing of a comprehensive program of resource development, conservation, and utilization for the soil and water resources
of this state

. . ."'

The 1967 legislature also unanimously endorsed

Legislative Resolution No. 5 which requires the development of a
State Water Plan by the Soil and Water Conservation Commission.
The Resolution specifically states that: "This State Water Plan, in
addition to an evaluation of the land and water resources, will also
include an examination of legal, social and economic factors which
are associated with resources development."
The authors were encouraged by the Commission to complete an
independant study of numerous legal aspects of the Plan prior to
the summer of 1972. However, because of recent interest in the subject of moving water from one water basin to another in Nebraska,
the authors decided this section of the larger study should be published now. Of course, this article does not represent the official view
of the Nebraska Soil and Water Conservation Commission and may
even at points be contrary to possible future policy decisions of the
Commission.
Before a comprehensive State Water Plan can be implemented in
Nebraska, a decision must be made regarding whether to permit
transfers of water from one drainage basin to another. This paper
has been written to enlighten both laymen and trained lawyers
about the bitter conflicts which have occurred in the past in attempting to obtain legislative authorization. A second goal has been
to analyze legal impediments and to show how other states have
approached the problem. Toward the end of the paper, an attempt
*Assistant Professor of Law, Florida State University
**Professor

of Law, University of Nebraska

***Chief Legal Counsel, Nebraska Soil and Water Conservation Commission, Nov. 1968-June 1970, member Nebraska State Bar.
The assistance of John R. Snowden in preparing this article is acknowledged with appreciation.
1 NEB. REv. STAT.

§ 2-1509(8) (Reissue 1970).
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is made to give an enlarged perspective by briefly looking at the
shifts in opinion over time and by suggesting criteria for possible
legislation.
Hopefully, the information in this article will be useful to
officials charged with understanding the problems of interbasin diversions, to citizens interested in the state's resources and to legislators engaged in the decision-making process.
The work upon which this publication is based was supported in
part by funds provided by the United States Department of the
Interior, Office of Water Resources Research, as authorized under
the Water Resources Research Act of 1964.
INTRODUCTION
With the exception of a few small drainage basins in arid regions, no river system has been fully regulated or used. In fact,
only a small part of the country's total flow volume has been
harnessed and applied for human benefit, 2 though references are frequently made to water "shortages." Actually, in most geographical
areas the problems involved in water resource development are not
attributable to the shortage of water, but rather to a natural misallocation.
Even though additional water may be needed to develop particular sections, other unit areas may have more than sufficient
water for long range development. This is especially true in Nebraska where each area of the state has one or more specific water
problems which relate to irrigation, domestic water supply, flooding, drainage, navigation, pollution, wildlife, or power. 3 For instance,
in one area groundwater is being "mined" because of heavy groundwater pumping, and in an adjoining area the water table is rising
to the extent that bogging occurs because of extensive agricultural
4
applications of surface water.
2

See Fox, Water: Supply, Demand and the Law, 32 RocKY MT. L. REv.
452 (1960); Milliman, Water Law and Private Decision-Making: A
Critique,2 J. LAW & EcoN. 41 (1959); White, A Perspective of River

Basin Development, 22 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 157 (1957).
3 NEBRASKA STATE PLANNInG BOARD, WATER RESOURCES OF NEBRASKA
4

(1941).
The counties of Adams, York, Clay and Webster all have areas which
are experiencing shortages while Phelps and Gosper counties are
experiencing just the opposite.
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Much of the waste and hardship resulting from natural misallocation can be corrected by sound engineering plans designed to
economically transfer water from points of plenty to areas of need.
Ideally, such transfers would maximize benefits for the state and
nation as a whole, stimulate growth in areas of need, and encourage
the most efficient uses of water. The promotion of the optimum
use of Nebraska's water resources by the elimination of misallocation problems is one of the goals of the Nebraska Soil and Water
Conservation Commission's "State Water Plan."5
It is axiomatic that efficient allocation of water resources is subject to certain physical limitations, but the degree to which those
limitations are muted is influenced by the current levels of technology, prevailing economic theory, political reality, and more subjective considerations such as motivation and ethics. Is a reallocation feasible? Would such a plan be economically and ecologically
sound? What effect would the transfer have on third persons both
in the areas of withdrawal and receipt? Is the water to be diverted
from one "watershed"6 to another? This last question, although
appearing the most innocent and perhaps irrelevant, presents the
specific issues to which the discussion in this paper will be directed.
This study is generally limited to the legal aspects of transbasin
diversion, i.e., the taking of water from the drainage area of one
stream and using it in the drainage area of another. Law, however,
and particularly natural resources law, does not function in a
vacuum; technological, economic, political and ethical considerations
must and will be noted, either expressly or impliedly.7
TRANSBASIN DIVERSION AND RIPARIANISM

Throughout history the natural flow of a watercourse has re5 L.R. 5, 77th Neb. Leg. Sess. (1967).
6 'Watershed" is used here in its general sense and not as a term of
art. See Ainsworth Irrig. Dist. v. Bejot, 170 Neb. 257, 273, 102 N.W.2d
416, 426 (1960).
7 "tltimately, however, so far as Nebraska is concerned, the question
is not so much of legality as it is of justice or morality." NEBRASKA
LEG.CouxciL Comm. REPORT No.2, REPORT OF THE Coiv rrITT
ON WATER
DIVERSION 33 (1944). "[I]t seems to me that when God takes the valley

here and the rivers, and the people settle in it, he intended (sic),
and the Supreme Court of Nebraska said that it was so intended,
that the waters of the river valley belonged to that river valley and
no other river valley; and that is the law ....

."

NEBRAsKA IRmrG. Ass'N,

PRocEEDiNGs or THE 44TH ANNuAL CoNVENTIoN 1697 (1936).
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ceived varying degrees of legal protection. 8 Weatherford has observed that during Roman times running water in its natural state
was classified as a resource common to all, and therefore, private
severance was influenced by the wanderings of the stream.9 Likewise, when the riparian theory was first introduced into the United
States, riparianism approached a natural law rationale. Watercourses were viewed and protected as self-operative distribution
systems. The riparian proprietors' correlative, usufructuary rights
were but an incident of owning riparian land. While nonriparian
owners were precluded from any use of the stream, riparian owners
were limited to use on riparian land.' 0 By definition, riparian land
is "land which is contiguous to and touches a watercourse; it does
not include land outside the watershed of the watercourse...."I'
The use is thereby limited to the boundaries established by nature
for riparian ownership."' 2
"Water used within a watershed surely finds its way back to the
stream.' 1 3 But when water is exported for use in another watershed,
both the initial use of the water and the benefit of the return flow
accrue to the area of receipt. Since under the riparian system the
8 For a detailed discussion of the riparian system of water rights see

Hutchins, Background and Modern Developments in State WaterRights Law, in 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 57 (R. E. Clark ed. 1967);
Doyle, Water Rights in Nebraska, 20 NEB. L. REV. 1 (1941); Doyle,
Water Rights in Nebraska, 29 NEB. L. REV. 385 (1950).

9 Weatherford, Legal Aspects of Interregional Water Diversion, 15
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1299 (1968). See generally, id. at 1299-1300 & nn. 3-5.
Weatherford makes the interesting observation that large-scale diversions via the aqueducts into Rome were an accomplishment of
public law, as distinguished from the private law of the usufruct.
The central notions of the Roman Doctrine were codified as the doctrine of riparian rights in the

CODE

NAPOLEAN art. 644 (1804).

Weatherford also notes the dispute as to the origin of the American
law of riparianism, that is, whether it was a transplant of French
civil or of English common law.

§ 766 (3d d. 1911).
(Reissue 1968). See, e.g., Clark & Martz,
Classes of Water and Characterof Water Rights and Uses, in 1 WATERS
AND WATER RIGHTS § 53.5 (c) (R. E. Clark ed. 1967); W. HUTCHINS, THE
CALIFORNIA LAW Or WATER RIGHTS 202 (1956); 1 C. KINNEY, THE LAW
OF IRRIGATION § 514 (2d ed. 1912); F. MALONEY, S. PLAGER & F. BALDWIN,
WATER LAW AND ADMINISTRATION, THE FLORIDA EXPERIENCE 191 (1968);
2 S. WIEL, supra note 10, at §§ 768-75; NATIONAL RESoURCES PLANNING
BOARD, STATE WATER LAW IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE WEST 6 (1943);
Doyle, Water Rights in Nebraska, 29 NEB. L. REV. 385, 405 (1950). See
also Lauer, Reflections on Riparianism,35 Mo. L. REV. 1, 5-7 (1970).
2 H. FARNHAM, WATER AND WATER RIGHTS § 463a (1904).

10 1 S.
11 VA.

12

WEIL, WATER RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN STATES
CODE

§ 62.1-104(5)

13 1 S. WIEL, supra note 10, at § 773.
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water right is neither lost through nonuse nor limited to the amount
presently being used, any loss due to transbasin diversion undermines the system even when sufficient amounts would remain for
present inbasin needs. "If the irrigation of nonriparian lands was
permitted by a riparian owner, even if there was not material injury
to those below him on the stream, by prescription and adverse user,
it might ripen into a right, which
would result in great loss to the
4
other owners on the stream."'
To give this "watershed limitation" meaning it became incumbent upon the courts to explain what was meant by "watershed."
California gave the limitation its full effect. Each tributary as well
as the stream below its junction with a tributary was to be considered, for the purposes of the doctrine, as a separate and distinct
watershed. 15 If water were removed from the branch of the stream,
the watershed limitation would not be satisfied by merely returning
the surplus either directly to the main stream or via another
branch.16 This narrow definition results in maximum protection of
the area of origin and is consistent with the logic of the riparian
system, i.e., to give rights to a riparian to use the flow of the stream
which borders his land, diminished only by upstream riparian uses.
INTERBASIN TRANSFER BY APPROPRIATORS
Irrigation was practiced in the early "West" by Indians and
Spanish settlers; appropriations were allowed under the Mexican
regime, and the use of water was not confined to riparian land. 17
However, the essentials of the appropriative principle sprang not
from Mexican law and custom but rather from regions of California
where miners first applied the "first come, first served" theory of
prior possession to their mining claims.' 8 Later this concept of
1 C. Kum'Ey, supra note 11, at § 517.
25 Anaheim Union Water Co. v. Fuller, 150 Cal. 327, 88 P. 978 (1907).
See also Rancho Santa Margarita v. Vail, 11 Cal.2d 501, 81 P.2d 533
(1938) (where plaintiff's lands are below the confluence, he cannot
complain that a defendant riparian above the junction takes water
from one branch to irrigate in the watershed of the other branch.).
16 For a more expansive treatment of what comprises a "watershed" see
W. HUTcmNs, THE CALiroRNA LAW OF WATER RiGHTS 202-03 (1956);
1 S. WiEL, supra note 10, at § 773.
17 See W. HUTCmxS, SELEcTED PROBLEmS I3N THE LAW OF WATER RIGHTS
3N THE WEST 66-67 (1942). For a more thorough discussion of the development of the prior appropriation doctrine see Hutchins, Background and Modern Developments in State Water-Rights Law, in I
WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 57 (R. E. Clark ed. 1967).
18 1 S. Wim, supra note 10, at § 71. See Clyde, Current Developments ir
Water Law, 53 Nw. U.L. Ray. 725 (1959)
'4
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ordering rights was used to reserve large quantities of water for
"sluicing" and other mining operations.' 9 Eventually these early
rules, based on20 necessity, evolved into the present system of prior
appropriation.
The appropriation system as it developed in the western United
States did not generally adhere to the watershed limitation inherent
in the riparian system. In fact, as one early writer stated, "There
is no question now as to the right of an appropriator to divert the
water from a stream flowing in one watershed and by any21means
conduct it for the irrigation of lands in another watershed.1
The divergent nature of the treatment accorded transbasin diversion is partially explained by the basic doctrinal differences between the riparian and appropriative systems. While under the
riparian system the correlative right to use the stream water is
incident to bank ownership, the appropriative system declares that
the seizure of the water by diversion and the application of it to
beneficial use creates the right. Situs of the land is of little, if any,
legal relevance.2 2 Thus, in an appropriative system the emphasis is
shifted from issues of land ownership and incident rights to questions of proper possession and use.23
The departure from the "watershed limitation" was not purely
accidental; it was thought that to impose watershed limits on appropriators was to unnecessarily perpetuate one of the undesirable
characteristics of the riparian system. This feeling is clearly enunciated in an early Colorado Supreme Court decision:
19 1 S. WIEL, supra note 18, at

§ 73.

20 See 1 R. CLARK, WATERs AND WATER RIGHTS §§ 4.2, 15.1, 18, 38.1, 51.5
(1967); W. HuTcHrNs, supra note 17, at 66-67; 1 S. WIEL, supra note 18,
at §§ 66-142.
21 2 C. KINNEY, THE LAW OF IRRIGATION § 866 (2d ed. 1912); 3 H. FARNHAv, WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 671a (1904); NATIONAL REsoURcES
PLANNING BOARD, supra note 11, at 14-15.
22 Doyle, Water Rights in Nebraska, 29 NEB. L. REV. 385, 405-06 (1950);
see Hutchins & Steele, Basic Water Rights Doctrines and Their Implications for River Basin Development, 22 LAw & CoNTEmP. PRos. 276
(1957). For a constitutional expression of the appropriation doctrine
see NEB. CONST. art. 15, §b.
23 Also, "[ijnstead of carrying out the primitive idea that water is
publici juris, or the common property of all, [prior appropriation]
overthrows that idea by giving its use exclusively to those who have
appropriated the water in the first place .... [t]he door is shut to all
who have not already passed in." Wiel, Theories of Water Law, 27

HARV. L. REV. 530, 533 (1914). See also Lux V. Haggin, 69 Cal. 255,
395, 10 P. 674, 756 (1886).
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To apply the rule contended for [to prohibit transbasin diversion]
would prevent the useful and profitable cultivation of the productive soil, and sanction the waste of water upon the more sterile
lands.... Under the principle contended for [to prohibit transbasin diversion], a party owning land ten miles from the stream,
but in the valley thereof, might deprive a prior appropriator of the
water diverted therefrom whose lands are
within a thousand yards
24
but just beyond the intervening divide.
This right of appropriators to transfer water across the watershed
divide is not entirely without qualification. Initially, there is the
limitation which forms the essence of the appropriative system, i.e.,
rights vested prior in time cannot be adversely affected by later
users. 25 In determining the relative effect of a diversion it must be
remembered that since the benefit of the return flow and seepage
accrues entirely to the receiving basin, the full amount of the transferred appropriation is lost to the basin of origin.26 Also, statutes
which restrict interbasin transfers have been enacted in states which
adhere to the prior appropriation doctrine. 27 In states which are
governed by a dual-system of water rights, combined riparian-prior
appropriation system, i.e., California, Nebraska and Texas, trans28
basin diversion receives either uneven or uncertain treatment.
TRANS-RESERVOIR USE OF GROUNDWATER
The use of ground water on nonoverlying land, a trans-reservoir
diversion, raises problems similar if not identical to those involved
in transbasin diversion of surface water. Despite this similarity and
the desirability of meshing the use of and laws relating to ground
and surface waters, the transfer problems of each will be considered
separately. This paper will be limited primarily to surface water
24

25

Coffin v. The Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443, 450 (1882). See Mettler
v. Ames Realty Co., 61 Mont. 152, 159, 201 P. 702, 704 (1921). But see
Galiger v. McNulty, 80 Mont. 339, 356, 260 P. 401, 405 (1927). See also
Ide v. United States, 263 U.S. 497 (1923); Ramshorn Ditch Co. v. United
States, 269 F. 80 (8th Cir. 1920); Offlield v. Ish, 21 Wash. 277, 57 P.
809 (1899).
3 H. FARNHAam, supra note 21; W. HU.cHINS, supra note 16, at 142-43;
2 C. KNEy, supra note 21, at §§ 866-870; NATIONAL RESOURCES PLANNING

BOAxu, supra note 11, at 14-15.

26 Such a loss of return flow or seepage may be enough of an injury to

27
28

prevent the diversion. See, e.g., Southern Cal. Inv. Co. v. Wilshire, 144
Cal. 68, 72-74, 77 P. 767, 769-70 (1904).
See, e.g., CoLo. STAT. ANN. § 150-5-13(2) (a),(d) 1963.

For a discussion of the systems of transbasin regulation in dual system
states, see pp. 115-18, 121-24, infra
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problems. Ground water problems
will be analyzed in a different
29
section of the overall study.
THE NEBRASKA EXPERIENCE
Not all riparian states adhere to the "pure" riparian doctrine.
Accordingly, several riparian states sanction interbasin transfers.80
Similarily, states classified as espousing the appropriation doctrine
have in some instances limited transbasin diversion. 81 Nearly twenty
percent of the states have systems in which both doctrines of water
rights are given effect.32 In this latter group of states, of which Ne-

braska is a member, transbasin diversion receives varying treat8

ment.

HISTORIcAL DEVELOPMENT3 4

In 1877 the Nebraska Legislature's first attempt to further the
cause of irrigation in Nebraska made no mention of transbasin diverFor a discussion of Nebraska ground water law and problems, see
Harnsberger, Nebraska Ground Water Problems, 42 NEB. L. REV. 721
(1963)..
30 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 373.141(1) (Supp. 1971); IND. ANN. STAT.
27-1406 (Supp. 1971). See generally E. MALONEY, S. PLAGER & F.
BALDwiN, supra note 11, at 191-93; Ellis, Some Current and Proposed
Water Rights Legislation in the Eastern States, 41 IowA L. REv. 237
(1956).
31 NATiONAL REsouRcEs PLANNING BOAND, supra note 11, at 14. See, e.g.,
COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. 150-5-13(2)(d) (1963). See generally Johnson
& Knippa, TransbasinDiversion of Water, 43 Tmc. L. REV. 1035 (1965).
s2 The following states have applied a dual-system of water rights:
1. California
2. Kansas
3. Nebraska
4. North Dakota
5. Oklahoma
6. Oregon
7. South Dakota
8. Texas
9. Washington
F. TRELEASE, WATER LAW 5 (1967).
"The application of both doctrines in these states is explained by their
geographical location partly in humid and partly in semi-arid areas."
Clark & Marty, supra note 11, at § 51, citing Beuscher, Appropriation
Water Law Elements in RiparianDoctrine States, 10 BUFFALo L. REV.
29

448 (1961).

infra.
33 For a discussion of several of the "dual system" states see pp. 114-25
84 Many of the ideas and sources for this section were suggested by Neely,
Legislative History of Water Diversion in the State of Nebraska (an
unpublished paper on file at the Nebraska State Historical Society).
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sion, nor was the legislation intended to influence the issue.8 5 Prior
to 1889, Nebraska operated almost solely under the common law
riparian system of water rights 6 Although it is only conjecture to
indicate what the Nebraska Supreme Court would have done with
an interbasin transfer issue at that time, a later Nebraska Supreme
Court suggests that common3 law
riparianism would have been found
7
to prohibit such a diversion.
In 1889, when the legislature first declared that water rights could
be acquired in Nebraska by appropriation for a beneficial use,38 a
provision germane to the transbasin diversion issue was included.
It provided that: "[T]he water appropriated from a river or stream
shall not be turned or permitted to run into the waters or channel
of any other river or stream than that from which it is taken or
appropriated. 89 There can be little doubt that the intent of this
section was to apply a watershed limitation to the fledgling appropriation system.40
In 1893, when the legislature amended certain sections of the irrigation laws, this strict prohibition was qualified, if not eliminated.
The statute, as it emerged from the 1893 legislature, is identical to
that in force today.
The water appropriated from a river or stream shall not be turned
or permitted to run into the waters or channel of any other river
or stream than that from which it is taken or appropriated, unless
such stream exceeds in width one hundred feet, in which event
not more than seventy-five percent of the regular flow shall be
taken.41
35 This act, Neb. Laws 168 (1877), gave irrigation companies the power
of eminent domain to acquire rights of way for canals, dams,
reservoirs, etc.
86 "So much of the common law of England as is applicable and not inconsistent with the Constitution of the United States, with the organic
law of this state, or with any law passed or to be passed by the Legislature of this state, is adopted and declared to be the law within the
State of Nebraska." NE.

REv. STAT. § 49-101 (Reissue 1968).

37

See Osterman v. Central Neb. Pub. Power & Irrig. Dist., 131 Neb. 356,
268 N.W.334 (1936).

38

NE. Com. STAT. ch. 93a, p. 844 (1889).

9 NE. Comp. STAT. ch. 93a, art. I, § 6 (1889).
40 At this point in development, Nebraska was enacting only piecemeal
legislation rather than a comprehensive water or irrigation code. A
codified appropriation system, unlimited by riparianism, might well
have specifically provided for transbasin diversion, or at least omitted
inferences to the contrary.
41 NE. REV. STAT. § 46-206 (Reissue 1968) (emphasis added). The original section is NEB. Comp. STAT. ch. 93a, art. I, § 6 (1893).
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With the addition of the modifying phrase, the section would seem
to provide a legislative sanction for diversion and make the prohibition inapplicable to seventy-five percent of the regular flow
in the major streams of Nebraska.
In 1895 the legislature undertook a complete revision of existing
irrigation laws; using the Wyoming irrigation code as a model, a
comprehensive statutory scheme was enacted. One of the few prior
sections not repealed by the new code was the above quoted section.42 The new code did contain another provision relevant to the
diversion issue which is also currently in force.
The owner or owners of any irrigation ditch or canal shall carefully maintain the embankments thereof so as to prevent waste
therefrom, and shall return the unused water from such ditch or
canal with as little waste thereof as possible to the 43
stream from
which such water was taken, or to the Missouri River.
Although this section does not explicitly prohibit interbasin transfers, it does require all the surplus water to be returned to the
stream of origin. In most instances this would have the practical
effect of prohibition because of economic and practical considerations.
It is interesting to note that if the italicized portion of the statute
were given its full effect, a substantial portion of the statute would
be rendered nugatory. This assumes that the section was intended
to prohibit transbasin diversion, as opposed to merely prohibiting
waste. Since all of Nebraska lies in the Missouri River Basin, no
matter which stream return surplus flowed into, it would find its
way to the Missouri River. As will be discussed later, the section
has not received such a broad interpretation.
It was not until the adoption of the amendments drafted by the
1919-20 Constitutional Convention that Nebraska had constitutional
provisions relating to water resources and their utilization. The early
constitutions, those of 1866 and 1875, made no mention of water,
irrigation or any related subject. The control of such matters had
been jointly exercised by the legislature and the courts as they
modified or interpreted the English common law. 44 The amendments
are now found in Article XV:45
42

43

Neb. Laws c. 69 (1895). Section 2037 of Cobbey's Consolidated Statutes
of Nebraska was not repealed by chapter 69; § 2037 is the same statute
as that referred to in note 37 supra.
NEB. REv. STAT. § 46-265 (Reissue 1968) (emphasis added). The original section is Neb. Laws c. 69, § 59 (1895).

44 NEB. REv. STAT.
45

NEiB. CONST. art.

§ 49-101 (Reissue 1968).

XV, §§ 4-7.
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Sec. 4 Water a public necessity. The necessity of water for domestic use and for irrigation purposes in the State of Nebraska is
46
hereby declared a natural want.
Sec. 5 Use of water dedicated to people. The use of the water of
every natural stream within the State of Nebraska is hereby dedicated to the people of the state for beneficial purposes, subject to
the provisions of the following section.
Sec. 6 Right to divert unappropriated waters. The right to divert
unappropriated waters of every natural stream for beneficial use
shall never be denied except when such denial is demanded by the
public interest. Priority of appropriation shall give the better right
as between those using the water for the same purpose, but when
the waters of any natural stream are not sufficient for the use of
all those desiring to use the same, those using the water for domestic purposes shall have preference over those claiming it for
any other purposes, and those using the water for agricultural purposes shall have the preference over those using the same for manufacturing purposes. Provided, no inferior right to the use of the
waters of this state shall be acquired by a superior right without
just compensAtion therefor to the inferior user.
Sec. 7 Use of water for power purposes. The use of the waters of
the state for power purposes shall be deemed a public use and shall
never be alienated, but may be leased or otherwise developed as

by law prescribed.
It is reasonable to conclude that there are no explicit constitutional

prohibitions to transbasin diversion. In fact, as will be discussed
later, the constitution leaves the matter to the discretion of the
legislature.
The Nebraska constitutional and statutory law was set by 1920,
but not until 1936 did the controversy become apparent. The Central
Nebraska Public Power and Irrigation District, referred to as TriCounty, proposed construction of the Kingsley Dam and storage
reservoir on the Platte River. The storage water was to be used
to irrigate some 500,000 acres of land, less than half of which
lay in the Platte Valley. The Department of Roads and Irrigation
granted Tri-County an appropriation for 600,000 acre-feet of water
from the Platte River. Sixty percent of this was to be used out of
46

The Supreme Court of Nebraska had defined a natural want to be one
which is absolutely necessary to human existence and declared that
legislative conservation and control of the water resources of Nebraska
for such uses is a public purpose. Nebraska Mid-State Reclamation
Dist. v. Hall Co., 152 Neb. 410, 41 N.W.2d 397 (1950). This section also
applies to ground water. Metropolitan Util. Dist. v. Merritt Beach Co.,
179 Neb. 783, 140 N.W.2d 626 (1966).
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the Platte watershed in the basins of the Republican and Blue
47
Rivers.
Numerous "appropriators" and "riparians" appealed the Department's granting of the applications and eventually the controversy reached the Nebraska Supreme Court.48 The supreme court
overruled the Department of Roads and Irrigation and revoked the
District's applications.4 9
The case, Osterman v. Central Nebraska Public Power and Irrigation District,0 has thus become the starting point for almost any
discussion of transbasin diversion in Nebraska. It will be analyzed
later in the portion of this section dealing with Nebraska case law.
Here attention will remain focused on the historical aftermath of
the Osterman decision.
In 1943, Senators Bowman of Adams County, Neubauer of Harlan
County and Osborne of Morrill County introduced a bill into the
legislature for the express purpose of authorizing interbasin transfers. This bill, L.B. 253, as orginally introduced, would have
amended section 46-620, Compiled Statutes of Nebraska 1929, to read
as follows: "I
The owner or owners of any irrigation ditch or canal shall carefully
maintain the embankments thereof so as to prevent waste therefrom, and shall return the unused water from such ditch or canal
with as little waste thereof as possible to the stream from which
such water was taken, or to the Missouri River; Provided, that
waterstored in a reservoir constructedin accordance with an application duly approved by the Department of Roads and Irrigation
may be used to irrigateland lying outside of the watershed of the
stream from which such water was originally taken and nothing
in this section shall be construed to prohibit such use.
More than 700 persons crowded into the Public Works Committee
hearings on L.B. 253, and residents from forty Platte Valley towns
entered appearances to show their opposition to any measure which
would have the effect of granting Tri-County's requests to divert
stored Platte River water and use it for irrigation outside the Platte
47 NEBRAsKA LEG. COUNcIL, Commr. REPORT No. 2, FNAL REPORT OF THE

48

CoMm. ON WATER DvERsION 24 (1944)
REPORT].
Id. at 25.

[hereinafter cited as 1944

49

Id.; Osterman v. Central Neb. Pub. Power & Irrig. Dist., 131 Neb. 356,
268 N.W. 334 (1936).

131 Neb. 356, 268 N.W. 334 (1936).
51 See L.B. 253, 56th Neb. Leg. Sess. (1943)
50

(emphasis added).
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watershed in the Elmwood-Hastings area.5 2 Of course, Tri-County
was the prime mover behind the bill; the chief antagonists were
irrigation districts. The proposed Nebraska Mid-State Public Power
and Irrigation District and the Platte Valley Public Power and
Irrigation District also vigorously opposed the measure.58
The hearings developed a number of issues and arguments, many
supported by vast arrays of contradictory statistics. Evidence was
presented regarding rainfall, the acre-feet of water available, the
contractual obligation involved, and the quantity and quality of
irrigable land. Additionally, the effect of the bill on the pending
tri-state water dispute involving Nebraska, Colorado and Wyoming
was debated. 54 Opponents argued that restricting the winter river
flow would lower the groundwater level on which pump irrigation
depended and that an intrastate policy of diversion would destroy
one of Nebraska's objections to Platte River diversion in Wyoming. 5
L.B. 253 was placed on general file, and when it finally came
before the legislature, Senator Raecke of Merrick County immediately made a motion that it be indefinitely postponedY56 After a
hectic debate during the afternoon session, the vote on the motion
was twenty-three affirmative, nineteen negative, and one not voting.57 Perhaps it was a general distrust of the engineers who claimed
there would be no water shortage that defeated the bill, 58 or perhaps sectional rivalry and hostility would have spelled defeat for
any measure based on inter-regional trust and cooperation. An
52 Omaha World Herald, Feb. 25, 1943, at 1 (morning ed.). About 500

53
54

persons backed the Platte Valley Public Power and Irrigation District, arguing that diversion should not be considered until it is
definitely established that enough water exists for present and future
Platte Valley irrigation needs.
1944 REPORT, supra note 47, at 26.
This dispute was finally resolved in Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S.
589 (1945).

55 Lincoln Star, Feb. 25, 1943, at 2; Omaha World Herald, Feb. 25, 1943,
at 1 (morning ed.). The pending tri-state dispute was used by the
diversion opposition in Osterman. Brief for Appellant at 19-20, Osterman v. Central Neb. Pub. Power & Irrig. Dist., 131 Neb. 356, 268 N.W.
334 (1936). For the rebuttal to the above argument see Brief for Appellee at 221-26, Osterman v. Central Neb. Pub. Power & Irrig. Dist.,
131 Neb. 356, 268 N.W. 334 (1936). See also, NEBRASKA IREG. Ass'N.,
PRoCEEDiNGS OF THE 44TH ANNUAL CONvENTION 167, 176-78 (1936).
56 Hastings Daily Tribune, May 17, 1943, at 1.
57 NEB. LEG. JouR., 52d Sess. 1462 (1937).
58 See Lincoln Evening Journal, May 19, 1943, at 6; Grand Island Independent, May 19, 1943, at 6.
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examination of the voting pattern exemplifies the traditional clash
between those counties north and those south of the Platte River.59
Yet, what reasons prompted Frontier, Gosper and Phelps Counties
to vote to kill can only be surmised. Perhaps it was selfishness or
a fear that the "haves" are always hurt when the "have nots" are
enriched. And, one wonders why Gage County would vote against
a bill that would seem to help send water into its own Blue River
watershed.
To encourage research, Senator Crosby of Lincoln introduced a
resolution instructing the Legislative Council to study the diversion
controversy and report its findings and definite recommendations at
the next regular session of the legislature.6 0 The resolution carried,
and the Council appointed a special subcommittee made up of
proponents, opponents and neutral interests. After an initial inquiry,
the subcommittee voted to expand its investigation to cover the entire water resources picture, both surface and groundwater."1
During 1944 the subcommittee held four public hearings at Hastings, Kearney, North Platte and Grand Island. At the Hastings
hearing, Mr. Ed Kent, an area farmer since 1940, expressed fear
that diversion would interfere with successful well irrigation; but
at the same hearing Mr. Forest Morrison, whose farm is located on
the Platte watershed divide and impracticable for pump irrigation,
could not understand why the law required some of his land (that
beyond the watershed) to go dry. 2 This type of conflict was repeated throughout the hearings. The arguments of the proponents
and opponents were not always eloquent, nor was any possible
3
argument omitted.6
As could be expected, the subcommittee produced a voluminous
report. The conclusions and recommendations of the final report to
the legislature may be enlightening. The findings included, inter
ala:

64

a) The total supply of water available for irrigation is less than the
annual prospective demand for water at the rates currently
charged.
69 See voter distribution chart, appendix infra.
60 L. R. 36, 56th Neb. Leg. Sess. (1943).
61 1944 REPORT, supra note 47, at 2.
62

63
64

Hearings on H. Res. 36 before the Comm. on Water Diversion 28, 34,
in 1944 REPORT (Hastings hearings).
Hearings on H. Res. 36 before the Comm. on Water Diversion 1-38, in
1944 REPORT (Kearney hearings).
1944 REPORT, supra note 47, at 53-71.

INTERBASIN TRANSFERS: NEBRASKA LAW-LEGEND 101
b) The usable groundwater supply is less than generally believed,
and state supervision is needed. However, people in affected areas
are not convinced such supervision is desirable.65
c) Government units must recognize water rights as property and
give them full legal protection.
d) By common consent, and without basis in existing law, the
people living in a river valley, as distinguished from the people
within the drainage basin but not in the valley proper, should
have first call on appropriated water of that river. By like consent, people within the basin of a river should have, as they now
have under existing statutes as interpreted by the Nebraska
Supreme Court, a priority of consideration above those living
beyond the watershed in other basins. If neither the residents of
the valley proper, nor of the basin, make full use of all available
water, then the state's policy should be altered to the exten
necessary to permit such unused water to be used in other
basins. 66
e) Within a reasonable time after the war ends, those Platte River
facilities as yet unconstructed must construct their facilities or
preference of use to irrigable lands beyond the
forfeit their
67
watershed.
f) The present law prohibiting transbasin diversion should be continued until it is established whether or not the available water
in the Platte River will be put to beneficial use within the Platte
basin. If it cannot or will not be so used, the law 68should then be
amended to permit its use beyond the watershed.
g) Presently, no new legislation is indicated. Legislation required
in the future must be based on further study and experience,
and the legislature should make such study the duty of a specified agency.
65 Nebraska is still without an effective program of groundwater regulation.
66 There is no system of priorities based on a three tiered approach, i.e.,
one, river valley, two, river basin, three, other. Systems that utilize
place of use as determining criteria omit distinctions between numbers
one and two. In fact, to implement such a proposal it may be necessary
to divest persons whose diversions fall within the second class which
would be inconsistent with finding (c) unless such vested "rights" were
taken for compensation through an eminent domain procedure.
67 This seems aimed rather directly at the proposed Mid-State facilities.
68 Note that the basin of origin is given an absolute preference without
regard to relative economics, shortages, etc.
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h) Maximum use of the water resources of Nebraska is not being
made. The conflicting interests of neighboring communities or
areas must not be allowed to jeopardize the welfare of the entire state. The luxury of quarreling over water rights, while the
water goes to waste, has become too expensive to be borne much
longer.
The report of the Committee appeared impressive, but it offered
no recommendations for clarifying laws governing interbasin transfers. It even failed to provide a starting point for more extensive
research and eventual proposals; instead, it only recognized a need
for "careful study and research into all relevant factors" affecting
transbasin diversion and eventual "definite recommendations." This
same need was recognized earlier by the legislature in L.R. 36
which initiated the study and requested the research to be done
and the recommendations to be made. 9 In any event, regardless of
what other effects the report may have had, public controversy over
the diversion question subsided for several years.
It was not until the 1947 legislative session that L.B. 257 was
introduced by Senators Peterson (Lancaster County) and Seaton
(Adams County).70 This bill would have made possible temporary
diversion of water beyond a basin of origin, repealing those provisions requiring unused water to be returned to the stream from
which diverted.71 When the Public Works Committee opened hearings on L.B. 257, over 1,000 persons were present. Sentiment was
evenly divided. 72 After six hours the committee went into executive
session. Senator Bevins' motion for advancement to the general file
failed; Senator Proh's (Gering) motion to indefinitely postpone
carried five to four.73 Nevertheless, a week later, on Peterson's motion from the floor of the legislature, L.B. 257 was advanced to
general file. Unlike its predecessor, L.B. 257 granted only a junior
appropriation to transbasin diversions, thus protecting future expansion in the valley of origin. In spite of this concession and certain
amendments to further pacify and satisfy anti-diversion forces, Senator Raecke and those he represented again opposed the bill. "People
who have studied the matter have discovered there is no such thing
69 L.R. 36, 56th Neb. Leg. Sess. (1943).
70 L.B. 257, 60th Neb. Leg. Sess. (1947).
71 L.B. 257, 60th Neb. Leg. Sess. (1947).
72 Lincoln Star, March 7, 1947, at 8.
73 Id.

INTERBASIN TRANSFERS: NEBRASKA LAW-LEGEND 103
as waste in the Platte Valley. Temporary matters become permanent.
Here is where the great danger lies."7 4
After five hours of debate, Senator Raecke moved, as he had in
1943, to postpone indefinitely any consideration of the measure. The
vote on the motion was numerically the same as it was in 1943.
Only a few districts changed votes and again there was a clear
North-South Platte split.75 As suggested by an editorial in the
Lincoln Evening Journal," few were ready to believe the factual
data of experts produced by the "other side," and voting along
territorial lines was the natural result.
The most recent attempt to enact transbasin legislation was in
1953 when Senator Marvel (Adams County) introduced L.B. 311Y 7
Public hearings opened with a crowd estimated at nearly a thousand.78 The issue was hotly debated, but the Public Works Committee delayed the bill's advance to allow time for its members to take
79
an aerial tour over the Platte Valley.
L.B. 311 attempted to formulate a public policy for Nebraska
that would allow diversion of surplus water, but would make any
such appropriations junior to all present and future appropriations
in the basin of origin.80 Still, the bill met with even less success
than before, the motion to indefinitely postpone being carried with
twenty-four ayes, ten nayes, and nine not voting.8 1 The over-kill
surprised even anti-diversionists as did the transfer of concentrated
opposition 2 from the Scottsbluff-North Platte region to the Kearney,
Grand Island and Fremont area. Since the defeat of L.B. 311, efforts
to effect change have not reached the legislature. However, the
recurrent problem soon moved back to the Nebraska courts as men
sought to develop their resources through large scale projects.
Hastings Daily Tribune, May 5, 1947, at 1 [This statement was made
by Senator Raecke as spokesman for the anti-diversion forces.].
75 See voter distribution chart and maps, appendix infra.
76 Lincoln Evening Journal, May 6, 1947, at 6.
77 L.B. 311, 65th Neb. Leg. Sess. (1953).
78 Hastings Daily Tribune, March 26, 1953, at 1.
79 Hastings Daily Tribune, March 27, 1953, at 1.
80 L.B. 311, 65th Neb. Leg. Sess. (1953).
81 Senator Bixer of Harrison had suggested that the issue be settled by a
vote of the people. He argued that L.B. 311 had affected every bill
introduced during the session, killing good ones and passing bad ones.
See Omaha World Herald, May 26, 1953, at 1 (morning ed.).
82 See voter distribution chart and map, appendix infra.
74
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TRANSBASIN DIVERSION IN THE COURTS
It will be remembered that the decision in Osterman v. Central
Nebraska Public Power and Irrigation District83 was credited for
initiating the political struggles just discussed. An analysis of Osterman, "one of the most poorly reasoned opinions ever handed
down by the court,"8 4 seems in order, even though it has already
received more than its fair share of scholarly criticism. 85
Tri-County had applied to the Department of Irrigation and
Roads for water rights, and had been granted an appropriation of
600,000 acre-feet of water from the Platte River. However, since
about sixty percent of the water was to be diverted to land located
beyond the Platte watershed and to the basins of the Republican
and Blue Rivers, downstream appropriators and riparians objected
to the Department's grant. The Department had found: (1) that
diversion would not substantially deplete the groundwaters of any
portion of the Platte Valley; (2) that there were unapproporiated
waters in the North Platte and Platte Rivers; and (3) that the
appropriations were not in any manner detrimental to the public
interest.8 6 The objectors then appealed to the Nebraska Supreme
Court.
In reversing the Department's action, the court: (1) disputed
the facts found by the Department and espoused a judicially announced public policy; (2) found it necessary to greatly protect
the subflow interest of riparian proprietors; and (3) set forth a
statutory interpretation which developed a rule of positive law
prohibiting diversion. Whether considered singly, or in conjunction,
the reasons for the decision are unpersuasive.
First, the court seems to have been convinced that the evidence
showing unappropriated waters in the Platte was incorrect, that
diversion would lower the water table destroying the riparians'
83 131 Neb. 356, 268 N.W. 334 (1936).
84 Yeutter, A

Legal-Economic Critique of Nebraska Watercourse Law,
44 NEB. L. REV. 11, 54 (1965).
85 See, e.g., Doyle, Water Rights in Nebraska, 29 NEB. L. REv. 385 (1950);

Olsson, Transwatershed Diversions, 15 NEB. L. BULL. 271 (1937);
Yeutter, supra note 84; Kastanek, Report on Transbasin Diversion
(1968) (an unpublished paper prepared for Nebraska Soil & Water
Conservation Comm'n).
86 Brief for Appellant, vol. 1, at 27, Osterman v. Central Neb. Pub. Power
& Irrig. Dist., 131 Neb. 356, 268 N.W. 334 (1936).
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sub-irrigation,8 7 that the river would dry up leaving desolate farms,.
and that Kansas (through the Republican and Blue Rivers) wouldreap the benefits of Nebraska's losses.88 These issues were questionsof fact and, at best, mixed questions of law and fact (law applica-tion questions). The legislature having decided that the Department
should determine them in the first instance, the court could not beexpected to reverse a reasonable finding of the Department. 9 Thereis nothing in Osterman to indicate that the Department had acted'
unreasonably or in an arbitrary fashion. Though outside the normal
scope of judicial review, the court decreed that as a matter ofpublic policy it would protect the natural fertility and abundanceof the valley of origin.9 0
Secondly, the court fashioned a riparian rationale to protect thesub-irrigation interests of the objectors. After citing Meng v. Coffee 9l
for the propositions of correlative and reasonable use, the court
hastily assumed that: (1) the groundwater involved was the subflow of the Platte, making the riparian doctrine applicable; 92 anct
Sub-irrigation occurs when the ground water level is maintained tosuch a height that the root zone extends into the water thus havingthe effect of irrigation without the necessity of surface application of^
water. The Platte River Valley is an outstanding producer of alfalfa,.
and the crop's success is generally thought to depend on sub-irrigation..
The court recognized this subirrigation issue as conferring standing oni
many of the objectors. Osterman v. Central Neb. Pub. Power &:
Irrig. Dist., 131 Neb. 356, 364, 268 N.W. 334, 338 (1936).
88 Id. at 362, 268 N.W. at 337.
89 See Yeutter, supra note 84, at 54-55. "The rule is that where the actioni
of the administrative officer of the state is not unreasonable or arbitrary, and does not exceed the duties and powers imposed, this court,
will not interfere with the findings of fact so made because to that
extent they involve an administrative, as distinguished from a judicial!
function." State ex rel. Cary v. Cochran, 138 Neb. 163, 174, 292 N.W
239, 246 (1940).
SO "It would be a sad commentary on our political organization, upon thedepartment of roads and irrigation, and upon this reviewing court, if'
in rationing this necessity of life this beautiful valley should be left;
with a dry river bed and ruined farms, because of any mistaken theorythat the protection of its natural fertility did not constitute a public:
interest within the policy of our laws." Osterman v. Central Neb. Pub.
Power & Irrig. Dist., 131 Neb. 356, 362, 268 N.W. 334, 337 (1936).
91 67 Neb. 500, 93 N.W. 713 (1903).
87

92 In addition, it is interesting to note that in years preceding this case,
Nebraska had suffered several dry years in a row and rivers had the
lowest annual flow since the turn of the century. These abnormally
low flows were the basis of the objectors' statistics. The court seemed
to accept these drouth statistics and thus took a very pessimistic view
when it determined the diversion would affect sub-irrigation.
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(2) riparianism prohibited interbasin transfers at common law.
of transbasin diversion would have to
Consequently, any approval
9
be found in the statutes. 3
Finally, turning to the statutes, the court resorted to a study of
statutory history to resolve an uncertainty in meaning which did
not exist. The Act of 188994 expressly required that unused water
be returned to the stream of origin. However, this act had been
amended in 1893 to allow diversion of up to seventy-five percent of
the regular flow when a stream exceeded one hundred feet in
width.9 5 But the court concluded that the Act of 1889 had not been
repealed by the Irrigation Code of 1895 even though these provisions
of the 1893 law were a part of the new code. The Act of 1895 required ditch owners to "return the unused water from such ditch
or canal with as little waste thereof as possible to the stream from
which such water was taken, or to the Missouri River." 96 This was
held to be a recognition of the policy embodied in the Act of 1889
prohibiting diversion, and the Act of 1895 being the later pronouncement, it necessarily controlled. 7 In this process, the words
"or to the Missouri River" were simply declared not applicable to
98
this case.
Most critics of the Osterman case realize that the result may have
been correct at the time. Doyle views the construction given the
statutes as a successful, if not skillful, avoidance of a constitutional
question.9 9 Yeutter similarly notes that a constitutional question
93 In this section of the opinion, Yeutter suggests that the court confuses

groundwater and surface water rules; "The appellants based their
argument on the ground water issue of a lowered water table, but
supported it on riparian theory." Yeutter, supra note 84, at 55. Addi-

tionally, the court did not refer to either McCook Irrig. & Water Co.
v. Crews, 70 Neb. 115, 102 N.W. 249 (1905), or Cline v. Stock, 71 Neb.
79, 102 N.W. 265 (1905), which limited the relief available to riparians
to damages.
94 NEB. COMP. STAT. ch. 93a, art. I, § 6 (1889).
95 Id.; NEB. Rav. STAT. § 46-206 (Reissue 1968).
96 NEB. COMP. STAT. ch. 93a, art. II, § 59 (1895); NEB. REV.STAT. § 46-265
(Reissue 1968).

See Doyle, supra note 85, at 406-07: "The clarity of this reasoning is
open to some question."
98 Osterman v. Central Neb. Pub. Power & Irrig. Dist., 131 Neb. 356, 368,
268 N.W. 334, 340 (1936).
99 See Doyle, supra note 85, at 407: "The return flow augments the supply
of ground and surface water and tends to protect the valuable right
of riparians to the benefits of sub-irrigation. If riparians possess such
a right it seems to follow that the legislature may not abrogate it
except by procedure insuring the payment of just compensation therefor. Thus the construction given these provisions of the irrigation code
avoided a constitutional question."
97

INTERBASIN TRANSFERS: NEBRASKA LAW-LEGEND 107
may have been lurking, but
decided by "balancing the
case, has not been expressly
however, has been severely

argues that the case should have been
equities."'100 Osterman, still a leading
overruled. Its authority as a precedent,
challenged.

Twenty-four years after Osterman, in Ainsworth Irrigation District v. Bejot,'0 ' the court "clarified" its position on transbasin diversion.10 2 The Ainsworth Irrigation District sought a permit to
transport 91,800 acre-feet of water by canal out of the Snake River
watershed into the basin of the Niobrara River to irrigate approximately 33,960 acres of land. 0 3 The Snake River runs north and
slightly east into the Niobrara River, which empties into the Missouri River. The District's canal was to run for about fifty-six miles,
intersecting and crossing several smaller streams en route. All these
streams were tributary to the Niobrara, and no water was to be
returned to the Snake. About forty-seven percent of the annual flow
of the Snake River at the diversion site (Merritt Dam) was to be
withdrawn.
The objectors, relying primarily on Osterman,10 4 argued that the
diversion would violate section 46-265105 of the Nebraska Statute
because water from the Snake River would cross the watershed and.
the surplus would flow into the Niobrara River, effecting an interbasin transfer. On the other hand, the Irrigation District claimed
that the Snake and Niobrara Rivers were but one stream, comprising
the same watershed or basin. The court agreed and accepted defendant's definition of a watershed:
100 See Yeutter, supra note 84, at 56-57. But see Olsson, supra note 85, at

286-89. Olsson suggests that the court really. did "balance the equities"'
which it determined to be in favor of the basin of origin. Then rather
than holding for complainants on this factual determination the "consideration was given effect by means of an application of the doctrine
of riparian rights, to the complete disregard of the logical result which
would be reached by an application of the doctrine of appropriation,
but the recognition of such a factor [the balance in favor of protection
of the basin of origin] seems none the less real because it was only
tacitly given." Id. at 289.
101 170 Neb. 257, 102 N.W.2d 416 (1960).
102 Some authorities argue that the Bejot case essentially nullified the
Osterman holding. Johnson & Knippa, supra note 31, at 1039.
103 The Ainsworth project was one of seven units in the Missouri River
Basin Project, and it had the best cost-benefit ratio of any units in
the project. Ainsworth Irrig. Dist. v. Bejot, 170 Neb. 257, 270-71, 102
N.W.2d 416, 424-25 (1960).
104 Ainsworth Irrig. Dist. v. Bejot, 170 Neb. 257, 272, 102 NW.2d 416, 425
(1960).
105 NEB. REv. STAT. § 46-265 (Reissue 1968).
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A river and all its tributaries constitutes a watershed, which
may be defined as all the area lying within a divide, above a given
point on a river or stream. The term watershed is synonymous with
river basin, drainage basin, or catchment area, except in some
instances, where by definition for specific purposes, in connection
the basin may have been extended upon
with specific agreements,
the natural watershed.' 0 6
Having agreed with the District that only one stream, watershed
or basin was involved, the court then stated that Osterman was entirely distinguishable as to both the facts and the law.10 7 Consequently, it did not have to deal directly with either the Osterman
decision or with the statutes construed in that opinion.
Bejot's effect on a factual situation that would involve an "actual"
transbasin diversion is unclear. The case could be distinguished on
the basis of defining watershed limits.

08

But as many commentators

argue, such an analysis is superficial, and if Bejot does not nullify
Osterman, it at best represents a new approach to the problem. 10 9
It appears that the court "balanced the equities" and, in so doing,
upheld what might otherwise have been an illegal interbasin transfer. The Snake River Valley is not a farming area. No irrigation
interests made any claim to the water involved. The only downstream appropriators were two small power plants which were
to be compensated for their damages. On the other hand, the project
was designed to irrigate 33,960 acres of good farm land in an area
where rainfall is not adequate for full crop production." And, as
the court points out, "[i]t appears to be undisputed that there is
plenty of water for all needs.""' Thus, denial of diversion could
106 170 Neb. at 273, 102 N.W.2d at 426.
107 Id. at 276, 102 N.W.2d at 427
108 California seems to have defined riparian use in relation to tributaries
with more specificity than most jurisdictions. Hutchins points out
the following guiding principles: Land which is not within the watershed of the river is not riparian thereto, and is not entitled, as riparian
land, to the use or benefit of the water from the river, although it
may be part of an entire tract which does extend to the river.
...Each tributary is considered a separate stream with regard to lands
contiguous thereto above the junction, so that land lying with the
watershed of one tributary above that point is 3ot riparian to the
other stream. As against lower riparian owners located below the confluence of a main stream and a tributary, however, the watersheds of
such main stream and of the tributary stream constitute parts of a
single watershed. W. HUTCHINS, supra note 15, at 202-03 [citations

omitted]. See also, Saunders v. Robinson, 14 Idaho 770, 95 P. 1057
(1909) (appropriator beyond the confluence cannot be heard to complain).

109 See, e.g., Johnson & Knippa, supra note 31, at 1039; Yeutter, supra note

84, at 57.
110 170 Neb. at 270-71, 102 N.W.2d at 424-25.
111 Id. at 271, 102 N.W.2d at 425.
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not be based on the possibility of injury; instead, the diversion
should be sustained because of the probable economic gains to
the state.
Whether this cost-benefit analysis underpinned the conclusion
that only one watershed was involved is uncertain. However,
"[t]o hold otherwise would deprive 33,960 acres of irrigable land of
needed water and permit it to be wasted in the Niobrara and Missouri Rivers, without authority of fact and law."" 2 This approach,
cost-benefit analysis or "balancing the equities," was applied in a
later Nebraska case which adjudicated conflicting riparian and appropriation interests. 1 13 Further, it is the touchstone of the next and
most recent Nebraska case to have considered transbasin diversion.1 14

The magnitude and complexity of the interbasin transfer issue is
aptly illustrated by Metropolitan Utilities District v. Merritt Beach
Company." 5 The Metropolitan Utilities District of Omaha hereinafter referred to as M.U.D. applied to the Department of Water
Resources for a permit to augment its water supply with 60 million
gallons per day of groundwater. By statute 1 6 the Director of Water
Resources is authorized to grant and administer permits to municipal
corporations supplying water to cities to develop groundwater supplies in the area to be served. After a hearing on the application
and the several objections, the Director of Water Resources granted
objectors lodged a direct appeal
M.U.D.'s application. Several of the
7
in the Nebraska Supreme Court."
The wells from which M.U.D. sought to draw the 60 million
gallons per day were located at a point on the Platte River about
five miles from the confluence of the Platte and Missouri Rivers. Of
the approximately thirty-five wells planned, eighteen were to be
located on an island (Cedar Island) in the Platte and the remainder
were to be taken directly from the river, the entire supply being

Id. at 279, 102 N.W. at 429.
A13 "An appropriator ... is liable to the proprietor in an action for damages if, but only if, the harmful appropriation is unreasonable in
respect to the proprietor. The appropriation is unreasonable unless its
utility outweighed the gravity of the harm." Wasserburger v. Coffee,
180 Neb. 149, 159, 141 N.W2d 738, 745 (1966).
14 Metropolitan Util. Dist. v. Merritt Beach Co., 179 Neb. 783, 140 N.W.2d
626 (1966).
112

"5 Id.
110 NEB. REV. STAT.

17

§§ 46-638 to -650 (Reissue 1968).

179 Neb. at 785, 140 N.W.2d at 629.
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drawn from, or at least through, the ground. Expert testimony explained that the amounts withdrawn from the well field would be
replenished by both ground and surface water sources. Fifty-six
million gallons per day would come from the Platte River, the
remainder from groundwater. The loss to the river was shown to
be less than a 1.1 inch lowering of the river's level. On the basis of
the foregoing evidence, the Director of Water Resources concluded,
and the court concurred, that the injury to the objectors was diminutive. The court then held that in the absence of proof of injury, the
objectors could not argue the constitutional issues which formed the
basis for several of their objections. 18
However, the water that M.U.D. sought to develop was to be
transported and used out of the Platte River watershed, and as
riparian landowners in the Platte River watershed, the objectors
were permitted to question the legality of such a diversion. The
Osterman case was cited as sustaining this right to object, 119 even
though the court was not necessarily bound by Ostermaan because
there it was assumed that appropriators and riparians would be
injured by the diversion.120 Furthermore, surface watersheds are
generally thought to be irrelevant when examining the place of use
21
by pumpers of groundwater.'
The court began its resolution of the diversion issue by citing
Meng v. Coffee 122 for the proposition that the common law was in
force except as altered or modified by statute. After an examination
of the state's groundwater legislation, which was nonexistent until
1957, the court concluded that what legislation did exist had developed in a patchwork fashion with the result that "[r]ights in the
use of groundwater have not been determined nor protected, nor
the public policy with reference to use of such underground waters
legislatively declared.' 12 A declaration of public policy was found
in the Nebraska Constitution where it is provided that the necessity
of water for domestic use and for irrigation purposes is a natural
118 179 Neb. at 793, 140 N.W.2d at 633.
119 179 Neb. at 797, 140 N.W.2d at 635.
120 Osterman v. Central Neb. Pub. Power & Irrig. Dist., 131 Neb. 356, 268
N.W. 334 (1936).
121 See Harnsberger, Nebraska Ground Water Problems, 42 NEB. L. REv.
721, 727-30 (1963).
122

67 Neb. 500, 93 N.W. 713 (1903).

123

179 Neb. at 799, 140 N.W.2d at 636.
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want. 24 The problem with the declaration is that this section of
the constitution, if read together with the sections that follow 125
and as limited by the cases that have interpreted it, would apply
to surface water only.126 Nevertheless, the court preferred the
broader application, i.e., including groundwater within the stated
declaration, because "[s]uch waters are as much a part of the hydrologic cycle as the flow of water in a stream or river."'127 It was then
concluded that "[s]uch waters must be reasonably used for a beneficial purpose without waste,' 128 and that domestic use for health,
convenience and comfort is a public use. 29 The ultimate conclusion
was that "[w]here the taking of water beyond a watershed causes
no injury to appropriators or riparian owners, no reason exists
for not permitting the use of waters for,30 a public and beneficial
purpose which would be otherwise lost.'
Osterman conferred standing to raise the issue of transbasin use.
Yet, since the M.U.D. court assumed it was dealing with groundwater,'8 ' there was no discussion of the statutes, sections 46-206
and 46-265,' 2 which formed the basis of the Osterman decision.
Finally, Osterman, the case that conferred standing, was dismissed
as inapplicable even "by analogy";133 the court chose to decide the
case on another ground:
But we choose to decide the question on the ground of reasonable
use and all the factors that enter into such a consideration including
CONST. art. 15, § 4. See note 46 supra. The Supreme Court of
Nebraska had defined a natural want to be one which is absolutely
necessary to human existence and declared that legislative conservation and control of the water resources of Nebraska for such uses is
a public purpose. Mid-State Reclamation Dist. v. Hall Co., 152 Neb. 410,
41 N.W.2d 397 (1950). This section also applies to groundwater. Metropolitan Util. Dist. v. Merritt Beach Co., 179 Neb. 783, 140 N.W.2d 626
(1966).
-125 See NEB. CoNsT. art. XV, §§ 4,5,6.
126 See NEB. CoxsT. art. XV, § 4, and accompanying annotation in 2 NEB.
124

NEB.

REv. STAT. 185 (Reissue 1968).

179 Neb. at 799-800, 140 N.W.2d at 636.
179 Neb. at 800, 140 N.W.2d at 637.
129 Of course, not all the water diverted to Omaha by M.U.D. would be
for such use. Large amounts will be used for industry, air-conditioning, recreation, commerce, golf course irrigation, etc.
180 179 Neb. at 801, 140 N.W.2d at 637.
'3' Nan. REv. STAT. § 46-635 (Reissue 1968), defines groundwater as all
waters beneath the surface of the land and may have forced the court
into this posture.
182 Nan. Ray. STAT. §§ 46-206, -265 (Reissue 1968).
33
179 Neb. at 801, 140 N.W.2d at 637.
127
128
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the reasonableness of a watershed diversion, thus preserving the
right of the Legislature, unimpaired to determine the policy of the
state as to underground waters and the rights of persons in their
use. Under the record in this case and the applications of the declared law in this case, we can find no basis for holding the diversion from the well field to be unlawful. Under the evidence in this
case the transwatershed diversion was reasonable, for a public purpose, 4 beneficial, not against public policy, and in the public inter3
est.1

At least two contradictory hypotheses can be made about the
M.U.D. case. First, Osterman is "good law" and prohibits interbasin
transfers of surface water. However, the Bejot definition of "watershed" tempers the severity of the Osterman rule, and M.U.D applies
a reasonable use test to transbasin use of groundwater when no
substantial injury is caused to appropriators or riparians.
The second hypothesis is that Osterman has been impliedly overruled by: (1) the "balancing of the equities" which underlies the
"watershed" findings in Bejot; (2) the express "balancing of the
equities" in M.U.D. when the court combined the concepts of reasonable use and lack of substantial injury; (3) the recognition in M.U.D.
that underground waters and surface waters are part of one hydrologic cycle; and (4) the court's awareness in M.U.D. that fiftysix million gallons per day or ninety-three percent of the recharge
of the aquifer was coming directly from the Platte River.
The second hypothesis seems sounder even though the court has
continually been scrupulous in retaining and distinguishing Osterman. But large expenditures for project planning cannot be justified
on such an assurance. 13 5 The foregoing material accentuates the need
for legislative clarification so that rational inquiry concerning alternatives for maximum water utilization will be encouraged. 136
OTHER LEGAL OBJECTIONS
The Nebraska Supreme Court has not discussed the one remaining legal problem that is often raised and which deserves at least
a cursory treatment: Is transbasin diversion an unconstitutional
134 Id. at 801-02, 140 N.W.2d at 637.
135 The Nebraska Legislative Council Committee on Ground and Surface
Water has characterized the Nebraska situation as one in which transbasin diversion is permitted by individual court decision. See note 152
infra.
136 After the Osterman decision plans for other transbasin diversions in
Nebraska were abandoned. See Hutchins & Steele, supra note 22, at
296 (1957).
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intrusion of vested water rights in those jurisdictions which recognize the riparian doctrine?
It does not seem that any conceivable proposal would authorize
either the disruption or destruction of presently used riparian rights
or of prior appropriative rights without condemnation and the payment of adequate compensation. Therefore, these rights would not
be an impediment. However, a riparian does not lose his right
through non-use, nor is he limited to present use. Thus, it is argued
that to permit interbasin transfers would jeopardize vested riparian
rights to expanded future use, and it would thereby constitute a
taking of property without due process of law, 37 in violation of
both federal 138 and state' 39 constitutions.
A number of jurisdictions have litigated the authority of a state
legislature under its police power to shift from an existing common-law system of water rights to a statutory method of prior appropriation. These alterations of legal arrangements have almost
always been sustained against attacks upon their constitutionality,
and the basis generally has been that the losses inflicted upon nonusing riparian owners are so infinitesimal that no compensation is
due when such rights are subordinated or cut off.140
The claims of non-using riparian proprietors probably could not
be sustained in Nebraska. The people of Nebraska by constitutional
edict, the legislature by statutory mandate and the courts by refusing to strike down provisions limiting riparianism decided long
ago to modify the riparian rules. Both the constitution' 4 ' and the
statutes'42 provide that the waters of the state are dedicated to the
people for beneficial purposes and that the right to use them for
beneficial purposes shall never be denied. It was on the date of the
enactment of these and subsequent provisions instituting the appropriation doctrine 43 when the riparian suffered the "loss," if ever.
See, e.g., Lauer, supra note 11, at 19-20; Ellis, supra note 30, at 260;
Yeutter, supra note 84, at 56; Doyle, Water Rights in Nebraska, 29
NEB. L. Ray. 385, 407 (1950); Oisson, supra note 26, at 274. See generally, Waite, Beneficial Use of Water in a Riparian Jurisdiction, 1969
Wis. L. REV. 864; O'Connell, Iowa's New Water Statute-The Constitutionality of Regulating Existing Uses of Water, 47 IowA L. REV. 549
(1962).
138 U.S. CONST. amend. V; XIV, § 1.
139 NEB. CONST. art. I § 3.
140 Harnsberger, Eminent Domain and Water, in 4 WATm Am WATE
RiGHTS 63 (R. E. Clark ed. 1970). See generally,id. at 61-64 and authorities cited therein.
141 NEB. CoNST. art. XV, § 5.
142 NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-202 (Reissue 1968).
'43 NEB. COasT. art. XV, § 6; NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 46-203, -204 (Reissue
1968).
'37
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It was then that he was divested of his "interest" which revested
in the state and was made subject to appropriation. Under these
provisions, as enforced by the Nebraska Supreme Court, 44 approwhich are in the watershed
priators are now using water on lands
145
but are nevertheless non-riparian.
Transbasin diversion which is consistent with the appropriation
doctrine'46 presents only one additional factor to the present Nebraska situation, the used water is usually not capable of being
returned to the basin of origin. But if the laws of Nebraska permit
an appropriator to collect his seepage and beneficially reuse it, as
one court suggests,' 47 then so long as there is a beneficial use of all
the water diverted, 148 there should be no distinction made on this
basis.
To reduce the possibility of an unconstitutional "taking" when
authorizing transbasin diversions, legislative provisions should be
included to safeguard the area of origin and its future develop49
ment.
TRANSBASIN DIVERSION IN OTHER STATES
In 1967, at the request of the Nebraska Legislature, the Legislative Council appointed an interim committee to consider the proper
utilization of ground and surface water. 50 During the course of the
I44

145

146

147
148

149

See Crawford Co. v. Hathaway, 67 Neb. 325, 93 N.W. 781 (1903); Cline
v. Stock, 71 Neb. 79, 102 N.W. 265 (1905), rev'g on rehearing, 71 Neb.

70, 98 N.W. 454 (1904); McCook Irrig. & Water Power Co. v. Crews,
70 Neb. 115, 102 N.W. 249 (1905), rev'g on rehearing, 70 Neb. 109, 96
N.W. 996 (1903); Wasserburger v. Coffee, 180 Neb. 149, 141 N.W.2d 738
(1966). See also Brummund v. Vogel, 194 Neb. 415, 168 N.W.2d 24
(1969), noted in 19 NEB. ST. B.J. 64 (1970).
It is interesting to note, as one commentator has observed, that in
Nebraska a riparian is prohibited from using water on non-riparian
lands, Doyle, Water Rights in Nebraska, 20 NEB. L. REV. 1, 14 (1941),
but an appropriator is not so limited. Doyle, Water Rights in Nebraska
29 NE. L. REV. 385, 403-05 (1950).
See p. 91-93 supra.
United States v. Tilley, 124 F.2d 850 (8th Cir. 1941).
This could be accomplished by using the inbasin supplies as a vehicle
to carry and apply the foreign water.
In planning for future development the Nebraska Soil and Water Conservation Commission worked under the following assumption: "Transfer of water between river basins is permissible providing the basin of
water origin has the opportunity to use water within the basin for
reasonably full development."

NEBRASNA SoIL AND WATER CONSERVATION
COMM'N, REPORT ON THE FRAMEWORK STUDY, STATE WATER PLAN PUB-

LICATION No. 101, at 227 (1971).
150 L.R. 44, 17th Neb. Leg. Sess. (1967).
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investigation several committee members, together with representatives of the state water agencies, toured California, Colorado,
New Mexico, and Texas where they studied problems of water
utilization, administration and legislation. 151 Transbasin diversion
was one of the issues reviewed by the committee; its report lists
each of the four selected states as permitting diversion. 152 Therefore it is worthwhile to examine the principal provisions governing
interbasin transfers in each of the states visited by the committee.
CALIFORNIA'53

Since the early days of mining in the Sierra foothills, miners and
farmers alike have diverted water from its regular channels for
transfer to distant lands outside the basin. This right to divert water
not needed to satisfy inbasin rights of prior appropriators and
riparian proprietors was always recognized by the California
courts.

54

In

the early thirties, however, the legislature made

statutory changes in the Water Code which imposed restrictions
on the exportation of water from the areas of origin. The first restraint came in 1931 when the "county of origin" law was enacted.
This statute prevented granting priority to appropriations made pursuant to a state water plan if the water was necessary to develop
the county where the water originated. 55 Two years later the policy
151 NEBRASKA LEG. COuNcIL, Comm.ON GROUND AND SURFACE WATER, REPORT No.165, at 1 (1968).
152

'53

Id. at 21. Interestingly enough, Nebraska is categorized as allowing
diversion by "individual decision by court."
See generally,W. HuTcHINs, supra note 16, at 142-45; C. MEYERs & A.
TARLOcK, WATER REsouRcEs

MANAGEMENT

323-64 (1971); Johnson &

Knippa, supra note 31; Weatherford, supra note 9; Comment, Legal

Planningfor the Transfer of Water Between River Basins: A Proposal
for the Establishment of the Interbasin Transfer Commission, 55 CoRNELL L. REV. 809, 821-23 (1970); 12 STAN. L. REv. 439 (1960); Wood,

Water Allocation and Social Institutions, PsocEEDiNGs

OF TmE CONFERENCE ON EcoNoIucs OF CALIFORNIA's WATER DEVELOPMENT 43 (1958);

154

Ciriacy-Wantrup, Some Economic Issues in Water Rights, 37 J.FARM
EcoN. 875, 883-85 (1955); Johnson, The Area of Origin and A. Columbia River Diversion, 46 WAsH. L. REV. 245, 250-55 (1971); Gindier &
Holburt, Water Salinity Problems:Approaches to Legal and Engineering Solutions, 9 WAT. REs. J.329, 373-75 (1969).
W. Hurcmxs, supra note 16, at 142.

i5"No priority under this part shall be released nor assignment made of
any application that will, in the judgment of the board, deprive the
county in which the water covered by the application originates of
any water necessary for the development of the county." CAL. WATER
CODE § 10505 (West Supp. 1971).
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was expanded. The new restrictions applied to the construction and
operation of the Central Valley Project:
[A] watershed or area wherein water originates, or an area immediately adjacent thereto which can conveniently be supplied
with water therefrom, shall not be deprived by the department
directly or indirectly of the prior right to all the water reasonably
required to adequately supply the beneficial needs of the watershed
area or any of the inhabitants or property owners therein.156
Then, in 1959, the California Legislature enacted as a part of
General State Policy a provision suggesting further protection to

areas of origin:
It is hereby declared to be the established policy of this State
that in the development and completion of any general or co-ordinated plan prepared and published by the Department of Water Resources or any predecessor thereof or successor thereto, all uses,
including needs of the area in which the water originates, of water
shall be given consideration.
Whenever the Legislature authorizes the construction or acquisition by the State of any project which will develop water for use
outside the watershed in which it originates, the Legislature shall
at the same time consider the authorization and the construction or
acquisition of. such other works as may be necessary to develop
water to satisfy such of the reasonable ultimate requirements of
such watershed as may be needed at the time the export project
is authorized or as will be needed within a reasonable time thereafter. The authorization with respect to such additional works
may provide for state acquisition or construction, in whole or in
part, of any such additional works, or financial assistance to other
entities in connection with the acquisition or construction of such
works, or a combination thereof.157
Several aspects of the California scheme are noteworthy. First,
a political unit, the county, was first afforded water priority protection. It has been suggested that this unit was chosen because of fears
that "vague and undefined" terms denoting natural boundaries, e.g.,
"mountain regions," "watershed," would suffer constitutional in158
firmity.
Both the "county of origin" and "watershed protection" statutes
anticipate interim use by others until the water is needed to satisfy
the priority. 159 But under the "county of origin" statute, if the Department of Water Resources makes a determination that the trans11460 (West Supp. 1971).
157 CAL. WATER CODE § 108 (West Supp. 1971).
158 25 Op. CAL. ATT'Y GEN. 8, 15 (1955).
159 25 Op. CAL. ATT'Y GEN. 8 (1955)

156 CAL. WATER CODE §

INTERBASIN TRANSFERS: NEBRASKA LAW-LEGEND 117
fer would not deprive the originating county of the water necessary
for development and the board makes an unconditional release of
the appropriation for uses in other areas, the use is then not subject
to the statute. 60 No similar qualification appears in the "watershed
protection" statute.
Both statutes have been criticized as repugnant to the California
constitutional requirement that the state's waters be put to their
fullest beneficial use, but the California Attorney General has ruled
that neither law violates the constitution so long as interim use by
others is permitted. 161 Lastly, it should be pointed out that the reservation statutes apply only to governmental projects. 6 2 Thus,
public appropriations are subject to the uncertainty of eventual
needs of the area of origin, whereas appropriations by private interests are not so limited. Consequently, state and federal appropriations may be encroached upon by later private appropriators.
When joined with the uncertainty concerning future needs, such
infringements can materially impede public development of water
resources. 6 3
It has been suggested that a governmental entity could nullify
the recapture right by resorting to the power of eminent domain.:'
While this is a possiblity, its usefulness is questionable because each
time someone in the area of origin seeks to assert his reservation,
either by expanding present uses or by creating new ones, a condemnation proceeding would have to be commenced.
The California reservation statutes raise serious questions, not
only in the conception of workable methods of implementation and
160 Op. CAL. LEG. COUNSEL, 1959 ASSEMVBLY JouR. 785.
161 25 Op. CAL. ATT'Y GEN. 8 (1955); 25 Op. CAL. ATT'Y GEN. 32 (1955).

But: "[W]e should further recognize that neither the doctrine of the
county of origin nor the watershed protection provisions have been
tested against article 14 of the California Constitution in any California
court and despite the opinions of Attorney General Brown in 1955
upholding the constitutionality, some constitutional lawyers feel that
these code sections violate this article." Wood, supra note 153, at 47
(footnotes omitted).
162 Both the "county of origin" and, watershed protection: statutes include
the federal government in their provisions. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 10504,
11128 (West 1956). Whether such provisions could be enforced against
the federal government is not at all certain. The federal government
has, though, provided for similar type protection for exporting areas.
See, e.g., Colorado River Basin Project Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1513 (Supp.
V 1970).
163 Ciriacy-Wantrup, supra note 153, at 883.
164 Johnson & Knippa, supra note 31, at 1043; 12 STAx. L. REv. 439, 454
(1960).
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regulation, but also because of the uncertainty with which such
provisions must be regarded by planners and investors. But despite
these doubts in both importing and exporting areas, California state
courts have not reported a decision construing the provisions, and
large scale diversions from the north to the south have not been
halted. The approval of the Water Resources Development Bond
Act,165 financing the Feather River Project, may indicate a general
belief that surplus water is and will continue to be available in
the northern part of the state or that needs in the north can be
supplied from alternate sources.
The "county of origin" provision has been cited as being responsible for at least one large pre-judgement settlement. This occurred
when litigation between the East Bay Municipal Utility District
and the Amador and Calveras Counties Water Districts was settled
in 1968. Under the provisions, East Bay promised to pay each county
2 million dollars for release of 1927 priority filings. 166
COLORADO

16 7

Colorado, a state that strictly adheres to the prior appropriation
doctrine, would not be expected to have legislative restrictions on
transbasin diversion. 68 However, proposals in 1943 to divert water
from the western to the eastern side of the continental divide resulted in a statute limiting diversions by water conservancy districts. 69
[Any works or facilities planned and designed for the exportation
of water from the natural basin of the Colorado River and its tributaries in Colorado, by any district created under this article, shall
be subject to the provisions of the Colorado River Compact and the
Boulder Canyon Project Act. Any such works or facilities shall

12930-44 (West 1971).
166 Agreements between Amador County and East Bay Municipal Utility
District, Aug. 22, 1958, and Dec. 26, 1958; Agreements between Calaveras County Water District and East Bay Municipal Utility District,
165 CAL. WATER CODE §§

Nov. 26, 1958, and Dec. 26, 1958; cited in Weatherford, supra note 9, at

1310 n.54.
See generally, Johnson & Knippa, supra note 31, at 1040-42; Weatherford, supra note 9; Johnson, supra note 153, at 255-56; Beise, Compensatory Storage, 22 ROCKY Mr. LAW REV. 453 (1950).
168 See the discussion of diversion in appropriation doctrine states pp. 9193 supra.
169 Water conservancy districts are created under and governed by the
Water Conservancy Act, COLO. REV. STAT. ANw. §§ 150-5-1 to -50 (1963).
See also Kelly, Water Conservancy Districts, 22 RocKY MT. L. REV.
432 (1950).
167
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be designed, constructed and operated in such manner that the
present appropriations of water, and in addition thereto prospective uses of water for irrigation and other beneficial consumptive
use purposes, including consumptive uses for domestic, mining and
industrial purposes, within the natural basin of the Colorado River
in the State of Colorado, from which water is exported, will not
be impaired nor increased in cost at the expense of the water
within the natural basin. The facilities and other means for the
accomplishment of said purpose shall be incorporated in, and made
a part of any project plans for the exportation of water from said
natural basin in Colorado.170
Unlike the California scheme, this statute applies its protection
solely to the "natural basin of the Colorado River and its tributaries in Colorado .... " The protection is very general, and it would
seem difficult to define or enforce. In connection with the prohibition
against impairment, it has been suggested by one author that, "[a]
project proposing to divert water from the Colorado River Basin
must construct a compensating reservoir that will leave the West
Slope in as good condition for present and future development purposes as if the transporting project had not been constructed and
the river involved had remained unregulated."' 171 This may well be
the case because the time when the protection is really meaningful
is before construction has begun and before new "equities" are
created. The statute does not include a recapture provision, and it is
unlikely that a Colorado court would imply one. Therefore, if future
needs are underestimated, the "natural basin" may eventually
suffer shortages. Likewise, if future needs are over-assessed, unnecessary facilities may be constructed and unneeded water may
be reserved.
Another part of the statute posing interpretational problems is
the prohibition against increasing the cost of inbasin water use. It
would seem to be a difficult task to determine at some future date
what the cost of inbasin water should be "but for" the diversion.
The statute, by its terms, applies only to water-conservancy districts. Thus, Denver, located east of the divide, is permitted to divert
unappropriated western waters for municipal use.
Although one authority has questioned the statute's constitutionality, the Supreme Court of Colorado has not yet had an occasion
to review it. However, the following language from a Colorado
170 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 150-5-13 (2) (d) (1963).

171 Beise, supra note 167, at 459. In the Fryingpan-Arkansas diversion
project, minimum stream flow and storage was required and an additional reservior was considered. H. R. Doc. No. 130, 87th Cong., 1st
Sess. 3-6 (1961).
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suggests
Supreme Court case decided after the statutory enactment
172
that the anti-diversion statute may be unconstitutional.
We find nothing in the Constitution which even intimates that
waters should be retained for use in the watershed where originating.
The waters here involved are the property of the public, not any
segment thereof, nor are they dedicated to any geographical portion of the state.
The right to appropriate water and put the same to beneficial
173
use at any place in the state is no longer open to question.
This suggestion may have validity if the statute were all-encompassing in its terms, but arguably the legislature has the power to
regulate and control an entity that it created, i.e., water-conservancy
17 4
districts. '
NEW MEXICO1 75
At an early date, New Mexico repudiated riparian theories and
adopted the appropriation system of water rights.1 7 6 Consistent with
the appropriation doctrine, there are no legal prohibitions against
transbasin diversion but merely the usual statutory requirements
governing appropriators. 1'77 In fact, New Mexico has enacted legislation which protects transbasin diverters in certain instances.
Whenever the owner of a ditch . . . or other works shall turn
or deliver water from one stream or drainage into another stream
or drainage, such owner may take and use the same quantity
of water,7 8less a reasonable deduction for evaporation and seepage ....
172

173

1

Johnson & Knippa, supra note 31, at 1041; Weatherford, supra note 9,
at 1314.
Metropolitan Surban. Water Users Ass'n. v. Colorado River Water
Conservation Dist., 148 Colo. 173, 202, 365 P.2d 273, 288-89 (1961). The
court made this statement in the course of a rejection of an argument
that Denver should be prohibited from diverting water across the
divide to the possible detriment of the basin of origin.
See note 169 supra.

174
175 See generally Clark, Water Rights Problems in the Upper Rio Grande

Watershed and Adjoining Areas, 11 NAT. REs. J. 48 (1971).

at 56-58; R. CLARK, NEW MExIco WATER RESouRcEs LAw 12 (1964);
1 S. WIEL, supra note 10, at 143-44.
177 New Mexico adopted a modified form of the Wyoming permit system.
Clark, supra note 175, at 57.
178 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 75-5-24 (Repl. 1968).
176 Id.
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TEXAS179

Transbasin diversions in Texas are subject to the limitations of
two separate acts. The first of these, the Watershed Prejudice Act,
was enacted as part of the 1913 irrigation code.180
It shall be unlawful for any person, association of persons, corporation, water improvement or irrigation district to take or divert any
of the water of the ordinary flow, underflow, or storm flow of any
stream, water course, or watershed, in this State into any other
natural stream, water course or watershed, to the prejudice of any
person or property situated within the watershed from which such
water is proposed to be taken or diverted.' 8 '
Before any person, association of persons, corporation, water improvement or irrigation district shall take any water from any
natural stream, water course, or watershed from this State into any
other watershed, such person, association of persons, corporation,
water improvement or irrigation district shall make application to
the Board of Water Engineers for a permit so to take or divert such
waters, and no such permit shall be issued by the Board until after
full hearing
before said Board as to the rights to be affected there2
by .... 18

Several commentators agree that the act has had little impact
upon the many interbasin projects. 83 As water becomes more scarce
and projects become more grandiose, this statute may take on added.

significance.i"
The Watershed Prejudice Act, unlike the California provisions
but similar to the Colorado act, does not provide a right of recapture
for the basin of origin. Once the Texas Water Rights Commission 8 5
179 See generally Johnson & Knippa, supra note 31; Weatherford, supra
note 9, at 1316-17; Johnson, supra note 153, at 257-58.
.80 Tex. Laws 1913, ch. 171, §§ 81-83, at 376-77.
181 Tax. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 7589 (1954).
182 TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN.art, 7590 (1964).
183 Johnson & Knippa, supra note 31, at 1044; Weatherford, supra note 9,
at 1316; Comment, supra note 153, at 820. See also Trelease, A Model
State Water Code for River Basin Development, 22 LAW & CONTEP.
PROB. 301, 321 (1957) (suggesting that projects are initiated and built
without much regard for legal considerations).
184 "Future water development by the Bureau of Reclamation in Texas is
concentrated primarily in long-range planning of inter-basin and
inter-state projects. These are theWest Texas and Eastern New Mexico
Import Project and the Texas Basins Project." REcLAmArON' ERA, A
WATER REV. Q., Nov. 1970, at 23.
185 This agency was formerly called the Texas Water Commission. Prior
to 1962 it was named the Board of Water Engineers. TEX. REV. Civ.
STAT. ANN.art. 7477 (Supp. 1970).
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grants an appropriation permit, with or without a planned interbasin
transfer, the only manner of reversing it is through appeal procedures. 18 6 And under the Texas "substantial evidence" rule, an
order issued by the Commission will be sustained if it is reasonably
supported by substantial evidence; the test is not whether it is
8 7
supported by a preponderance of the evidence.
In City of San Antonio v. Texas Water Commission, 88 the city's
application for a permit proposed a transbasin diversion of 100,000
acre-feet of water annually from the Canyon Dam Reservoir in the
Guadalupe River watershed. In an opinion denying the application,
the court considered a number of issues. One was whether the Act,
although appearing to prohibit removal of any of a basin's water
supply if there would be "prejudice" to "any person or property,"
should be given that interpretation. The court stated, "[s]uch a construction would have the intolerable consequence of defeating a
project promising immense benefits to the receiving region or the
State as a whole upon a mere showing of a slight harm to present
or future interest."' 8 9 The only diversions the legislature prohibited
were those which impaired "water rights in existence at the pro-posed diversion."9 0
[W]e have also concluded that as to any water in the originating basin found to be in excess of that amount required to protect existing rights, the Legislature intended that the Commission
should, in a balancing process, take into consideration future benefits and detriments expected to result from a proposed trans-basin
diversion and there would be "prejudice" only if the benefits from
the diversion were out-weighed by detriments to the originating
basin.'91
'he Commission drew a "balance" between granting part of the
unappropriated water for multiple use in the Guadalupe River
Basin, the place of origin, and San Antonio's application. The deTEx. Rxv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 7477, § 12 (Supp. 1970).
See, City of San Antonio v. Texas Water Comm'n., 407 S.W.2d 752, 756,
(Tex. 1966); Johnson & Knippa, supra note 31, at 1048; Halsell v. Texas
Water Comm'n., 380 S.W.2d 1, 13 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964) (In technical
areas the Commission's findings are to be given "extraordinary
weight.")
188 407 S.W.2d 752 (Tex. 1966).
189 Id. at 758. See Johnson & Knippa, supra note 31, at 1045-48.
190 City of San Antonio v. Texas Water Comm'n., 407 S.W.2d 752, 759
(Tex. 1966) (emphasis added), citing TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts.
7506-07 (1954).
-191 City of San Antonio v. Texas Water Comm'n., 407 S.W.2d 752, 759
(Tex. 1966).
186
187
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cision to prohibit removal of the water was sustained, the court

noting that water unappropriated and available for use within the
originating watershed is not necessarily the equivalent of unappropriated water to be used outside the watershed.

Part of the evidence introduced by the Guadalupe-Blanco River
Authority and the cities, counties, industries, and power companies
in the basin of origin was that "the Guadalupe River Basin is a
developing and growing industrial area and that urban communities
within the basin are increasing in size."'1 92 Thus, when the interests
are balanced in Texas, it is proper to consider not only existing and
future rights and use in the originating basin, but also the conse193
quential losses to that basin's economy.
Another problem presented by the Watershed Prejudice Act
and unique to the Texas situation is the lack of any provision defining "watershed."'194 Texas has some 7,500 named streams and
tributaries; a joint state and federal report listed eleven major
basins; a report by the Board of Water Engineers listed fifteen river
basins. 95 Such a definitional question could conceivably obscure the
more important determination, i.e., balancing the intra- and extrabasin interests.
If the "Watershed Prejudice Act" did not adequately safeguard
inbasin interests, they were certainly in mind when in 1965 full
responsibility for water planning was given to the Texas Water
Development Board.19 6 The Board was charged with forming a
"State Water Plan" for the state of Texas subject to the following
provision:
However, the Board shall not prepare or formulate any plan
which contemplates or results in the removal from the basin of
origin of any surface water to some other river basin or area outside of such basin of origin if the water supply involved in such
Id. at 762.
193 But see Johnson & Knippa, supra note 31, at 1045.
194 For further discussion of this definitional problem see notes 14-15
and accompanying text supra. To further complicate the situation
the Texas Water Development Board, the agency in charge of
water planning which neither governs nor is governed by the Texas
Water Rights Commission, has been charged with formulating a "State
Water Plan," "including a definition and designation of river basins
and watersheds as separate units for purposes of water development
and interwatershed transfers." Tsx REv. Civ. STAT. AN. art. 8280-9
(3) (b) (Supp 1970).
195 Johnson &Knippa, supranote 31, at 1049, and authorities cited therein.
196 TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. Axu. art. 8280-9, § 3(b) (Supp. 1970-71).
192
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plan or project will be required to supply the reasonably foreseeable future water supply requirements for the next ensuing fiftyyear period within the river basin of origin, except on a temporary, interim basis. The board shall be governed in its preparation
of said plan by a regard for the public interest of the entire state,
and shall direct its efforts to plan for the orderly development and
management of water resources in order that sufficient water will
be available at reasonable
cost to further the economic development
97
of the entire state.

It was first thought that this legislation might have the effect
of placing a fifty-year moratorium on large scale diversion projects. 198 However, the Supreme Court of Texas has interpreted the
act as applying only to the State Water Development Board and its
efforts to formulate a "State Water Plan," and not to limit in any
way the determinations of the Texas Water Rights Commission. 199
OTHER STATES
One other state which has a dual-system of water rights similar
to Nebraska is Oklahoma. In 1957, by legislative resolution, Oklahoma established the following guidelines to govern the State Water
Resources Board:
Before an appropriated or adjudicated right may be granted for
water to be ultimately used at a distant point, sufficient reserves
should be set up to take care
of the present and reasonable future
200
needs of the area of origin.
Limitations should be placed on transportation of water resources from any watershed or other source of supply until reasonable present and future beneficial needs
of equal rank within the
immediate area have been supplied.201

Though this statement expresses legislative concern for the basin
of origin, it would seem in no manner to hamper large scale water
developments. Rather, it would appear to merely restate obvious
criteria for sound water planning.
Not only is it permissible for water to be transported and used
out of the watershed of origin in most of the western appropri197
198

199
200

201

Id.
Johnson &Knippa, supra note 31, at 1050-53.
City of San Antonio v. Texas Water Comm'n., 407 S.W.2d 752, 757
(Tex. 1966).
H. J. Res. No. 502, at § 2(8), [19573 Okla. Laws 670. The text of this
resolution may be found in a historical note to OKLA. REV. CODE AwN.
tit. 82, § 1078 (1970).
H. J. Res. No. 502, at § 2(9), [1957] Okla. Laws 670. The text of this
resolution may be found in a historical note to OKLA. REv. CODE ANN.
tit. 82, § 1078 (1970).
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ation20 2 and many of the dual-system states, but also, many of the
traditionally riparian eastern states have enacted legislation which
would seem to foster such diversions. Mississippi has adopted the
prior appropriation system of water rights,20 3 Iowa has enacted a
comprehensive permit system, 20 4 and Florida,2 0 5 Indiana, 20 6 Maryland,207 Minnesota, 20 8 New York, 20 9 and Wisconsin 210 have all enacted legislation which could be viewed as authorizing or at least
removing impediments to interbasin transfers.
21 1
FEDERAL INTERESTS IN TRANSBASIN DIVERSION

Since only the internal water resource allocation problems of a
single jurisdiction have been discussed, our consideration of federal
interests is limited to two types of conflict. 2 2
202

Trelease, supra note 183, at 304; Hutchins & Steele, supra note 22, at
283.

203 &ss. CODE ANN.
204 IOWA CODE AN.

205
206

207
208
209

210

211

212

§ 5956 (Supp. 1968).
§ 455A (Supp. 1971). See generally O'Connell, Iowa's

New Water Law, Mich. State Univ. Water Rights Conferences. 54
(March 29, 1960); O'Connell, supra note 137.
FLA. STAT. § 373.141(1) (1969). See generally F. MALONY, S. PLAGER,
F. BALDWIN, supra note 10, at 189-93.
IND.AN. STAT. § 27-1406 (1970). See generally,Waite, supra note 137.
MD.ANN. CODE art. 96A §§ 1-22 (Supp. 1970).
AyinN. STAT. ANN. § 105.38-.64 (1964). See generally, Ellis, supra note
30, at 239-41.
N.Y. CoNsEnv. LAW § 429-j (McKinney 1967): "[Any alteration of any
watercourse or lake] is reasonable and lawful as against any person...
having an interest in such watercourse or lake, unless such alteration
is causing harm to him or it . ..."
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 30.18 (1964). See generally Ellis, supra note 30, at
239; Harnsberger, PrescriptiveWater Rights in Wisconsin, 1961 Wis.
L. REv. 47; Waite, supra note 137.
See generally Johnson & Knippa, supra note 31, Weatherford, supra
note 9; Comment, supra note 153. See also Goldberg, InterpositionWild West Water Style, 17 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1964); Sax, Problems of
Federalismin Reclamation Laws, 37 U. COLO. L. REV. 49 (1964).
One of the problems on which textual discussion has been eliminated
is that of interstate diversion of water from the state of origin.
Nearly 30% of the states limit the diversion of water beyond state
boundaries. Comment, supra note 153, at 826, and authorities cited
therein.
"While there is no established law on this subject there is considerable authority to the effect that a state law prohibiting exportation of its resources beyond the state line is an unconstitutional impediment to interstate commerce. See Pennsylvania v. West Virginia,
262 U.S. 553 (1923); West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229
(1911); City of Altus v. Carr, 255 F. Supp. 828 (W.D. Tex. 1966),

126

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 51, NO. 1 (1971)

INTRASTATE DIVEMSION OF INTERSTATE STREIMS
States A and B share an interstate stream. The conflict usually
arises when A, being located upstream from B, enacts legislation
permitting transbasin diversion with the result that less water flows
into B. B, urging the common law limitations, seeks relief in the
federal courts. In this situation, the attempt of one state to invoke
the riparian anti-diversion doctrine as limiting the water use of
another state will probably be unsuccessful.
In Wyoming v. Colorado 218 the Court rejected Wyoming's argument that Colorado could not divert the waters of the Laramie River
into the Poudre Valley, thereby denying Wyoming the use of the
diverted portions of the Laramie River and its return flow. The
Supreme Court did place a limitation on Colorado's divertable appropriation, but rejected any watershed limitation. Since neither
state limited the place of use nor prohibited transbasin diversion,
"[t]he objection ... to the proposed diversion on the ground that
it is to another watershed [is] ... untenable."2 14 In two later cases,
both decided in 1931, the Supreme Court likewise rejected antidiversion arguments. 215 In one of the cases, the Court's rejection was
based upon the absence of a showing of damage, 216 and in the other
the Court recognized that the beneficial use17of water resources
should take precedence over formal doctrine.
aff'd per curiam, 385 U.S. 35 (1966), noted, 47 ORE. L. REv. 228 (1968).
See the discredited contrary view in Hudson County Water Co. v.

McCarter, 209 U.S. 349 (1908)

."

J. SAX, WATER LAW PLANNING & POLICY

90 (1968).
For more information on this topic, see generally id.

at 89-90;

Brown & Duncan, Legal Aspects of a Federal Quality Surveillance
System, 68 MIcH. L. REV. 1131, 1146 (1970); Johnson & Knippa, supra
note 31, at 1056-57; Weatherford, supra note 9, at 1321-23; White,

Reasonable State Regulation of the Interstate Transfer of Percolating
Water, 2 NAT. RES. LAW 383 (1969); Comment, supra note 153, at 826-28.
213 259 U.S. 419 (1922).
214 Id. at 466.
215 Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660 (1931); New Jersey v. New
York, 283 U.S. 336 (1931).

216 Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660, 674 (1931). The court, after
pointing out that both of the States involved in the controversy followed the riparian doctrine stated: "And every State is free to change
its laws governing riparian ownership and to permit appropriations of

the flowing waters for such purposes as it may deem wise ...
Id. at 670.
217 New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 343 (1931): "The removal of
water to a different watershed obviously must be allowed at times
unless states are to be deprived of the most beneficial use on formal
grounds. In fact it has been allowed repeatedly and has been practiced

by the states concerned." (Citations omitted).
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FEDERAL PROJECTS

The second area of federal interest is the situation where the

state's scheme of water law, whether it prohibits or permits removal from the originating basin, frustrates federal water planning
or use. The most common case would be where the Bureau of Reclamation is planning a large scale project that cannot be built because of an anti-diversion law. Of course, any federal project involving navigable waters will supersede state protective measures, 218 so our discussion is limited to intrastate development of
non-navigable waters.
Sax states that the federal government would have constitutional
authority to wholly administer federal water development projects.
Congress could govern the acquisition, loss and conditions of use of
water rights. 19 However, Congress in many instances has not seen
fit to exercise its full range of constitutional power but has, even
for federally planned and financed projects, deferred to state water
law.

The notion that state law does control is derived from section 8
of the Reclamation Act of 1902. The Act, though not dealing directly
with transbasin diversion, states that it does not "in any way interfere with the laws of any State or Territory relating to the control,
appropriation, use, or distribution of water used in irrigation, or
any vested right acquired thereunder ... ."220
The United States Supreme Court has not given full effect to this
all-embracing language and has made it clear that the Act does not
place all federal interests at the mercy of state water law. In fact,
"every controversy over the meaning of that section which has come
to the United States Supreme Court has been resolved in favor of
those who argued that federal
law should prevail over and preempt
22
inconsistent state law." '
At the present time a clear federal position on the interbasin
transfer of water is lacking despite pressures for a policy favoring
basin or area-of-origin protection. In some instances, restrictive
provisions have been incorporated into the particular projects.
218

219
220
221
222

See Harnsberger, Eminent Domain and Water, in 4 WATERs AM WATER
RIGHTS 1, 130-49 (R. Clark ed. 1970); Trelease, FederalLimitations on
State Water Law, 10 BuFFALo L. REv. 339 (1961).
J.SAX, supra note 212, at 105.
43 U.S.C. § 371 (1964).
J.SAx, supra note 212, at 106. See generally id. at 105-19; Johnson &
Knippa, supra note 31, at 1055-56.
See Johnson & Knippa, supra note 31, at 1053-55; Weatherford supra
note 9, at 1323-31; Comment, supra note 153, at 824.

128

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 51, NO. 1 (1971)
A recent example is... the statute authorizing the FryingpanArkansas Project in Colorado, which commits federal construction
and operation of the project to conformity with the Colorado watershed-of-origin statute, and even takes the extreme step of precluding the Secretary of the Interior 223
to acquire Fryingpan basin
water rights for use outside the basin.

Other projects have been designed on certain assumptions made
with regard to state law. For example, an early survey of the Bureau
of Reclamation recognized that the laws of the State of Nebraska
made it impossible to achieve maximum use of its waters. Using
information gathered by the survey, the Bureau designed a far
reaching plan which included interbasin transfers on the assumption that Nebraska would enact favorable legislation. 22 To date
Nebraska has not done so nor have there been any interbasin trans5
22

fers.

Some further idea of Congressional intention might be gained
by briefly noting two current acts. The Colorado River Basin Project
of 1968226 protects areas of origin by prohibiting the Secretary of
the Interior from originating any studies of water importation until
1978:
Provided, that for a period of ten years... the Secretary shall
not undertake reconnaissance studies of any plan for the importation of water into the Colorado River Basin from any other natural
drainage basin lying outside the State of Arizona, California, Colorado, New Mexico, and those portions of Nevada, Utah, and Wyoming 227
which are in the natural drainage basin of the Colorado
River.

Further, after the moratorium period of any transbasin diversion,
plans must include protective provisions for the states and areas
of origin. 228
The Water Resources Planning Act of 1965229 takes another approach to transbasin projects. The Act, though seeking to coordinate
water resources planning through establishment of river basin commissions, provides that no commission may "study, plan or recomJohnson & Knippa, supra note 31, at 1054.
224 S. Doc. No. 191, 78th Cong. 2d Sess. 78-96 (1944) (report of Sec'y of
Interior Harold L. Ickes), discussed in 1944 REPORT 48-52.
225 The transfer which was the basis for the controversy in the Ainsworth
case might be the only exception but even there the court permitted
the diversion only after defining "watershed" to include that situation.
226 43 U.S.C. §§ 1501-56 (Supp. V, 1970).
227 43 U.S.C. § 1511 (Supp. V, 1970).
228 43 U.S.C. § 1513 (Supp. V, 1970).
229 42 U.S.C. §§ 1962 to -62d-11
(Supp. V, 1970).
223
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mend the transfer of waters between areas under the jurisdiction of
more than one river basin commission. ' 230 Though the Act was
not intended to establish a transbasin diversion policy, 23 1 it (as well
as the other examples) gives the impression that areas of origin
will be given protection in federal development projects if there
is either local law or strong local opposition to water exportation.
NECESSITY, PRACTICABILITY AND ACCEPTABILITY OF
TRANSBASIN DIVERSION IN NEBRASKA
The status of transbasin diversion in Nebraska is uncertain but
by looking at the examples set by other states, it can be seen that
there is no inherent prohibition of interbasin transfers. However,
before any proposal is made for Nebraska, it will be necessary to

examine the particular needs of the state and determine whether
interbasin transfer is an appropriate alternative-both from the
standpoint of feasibility and of acceptability.
So far as economic theory is concerned, one of the most desirable
aspects to include in a water system is flexibility.P 2 By providing
machinery for the transfer of water between uses and regions, the
highest economic productivity of the water can be attained. Transbasin diversion, therefore, is one foundation
upon which a flexible,
233
highly productive system must build
Transfers to achieve full economic productivity are especially
noticeable in Nebraska where projections show several areas which
will have surplus water even after completion of all inbasin development under the State Water Plan. 234 These areas and the
estimated stream flow available for exportation are shown on Figure 1. In contrast with these surpluses, there are other major areas
42 U.S.C. § 1962-1(d) (Supp. V, 1970),
No. 603, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1965). See Johnson
& Knippa, supra note 31, at 1055.
232 See Smith, Organizationsand Water Rights in the Rural-UrbanTrans-

230

231 87 H.R. REP.

fer of Water, in EcoNomIcs ON PuBLIc PoLIcY nT WATER RESOURCE
DEVELOPMENT 253, 260-63 (S. Smith & E. Castle eds. 1964) ; Bagley, Some

Economic Considerations in Water Use Policy, 5 KAN. L. REV. 499,
506-10 (1957); Milliman, supra note 2; Weatherford, supra note 9, at
1305, 1334 et. seq; Yeutter, supra note 84, at 49-53.
233 Since the prohibition of fransbasin diversion is a type of preference,
a more thorough economic analysis of the problem will be presented
in the section of the overall study dealing with preferential rights to
water.
234 NEBRAsxA Son. AxD WATER CONSERVATION Comm'N, supra note 149, at
218-22.
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in the state which will still need supplemental water for irrigation
after full development of inbasin supplies. These areas as shown
on Figure 2 are:
(1) On the drainage divide between South and North Platte River
Basins in Cheyenne, Deuel, and Garden Counties.
(2) In Perkins and Chase Counties.

(3) Throughout the Eastern Republican and upper Little and Big
Blue River Basins.
(4) In northeastern Nebraska, especially in Cedar and Knox CounRiver Basin; and
ties; in the southwestern part of the Elkhorn
23 5
in the adjacent Shell Creek drainage area.

The basic framework study also points out the need for recreational
water surface areas beyond that provided for by inbasin development.2 6
In addition to identifying the areas of surplus and need, state
water planners have devised several "concepts for interbasin water
transfer that could be employed to more nearly balance water
'' T
supplies and anticipated future demands on a statewide basis. 2
The transfer schemes, however, do not meet the needs of one major
area that is suitable for irrigation. The high tableland in Cheyenne,

Deuel and southern Garden Counties, bounded by the North and
South Platte Rivers, are in an area of low rainfall where groundwater is not sufficient for development, and where both of the
Platte Rivers are fully developed.23

In a recent speech to the Nebraska Irrigation Association, Commissioner Armstrong of the Bureau of Reclamation, United States
Department of the Interior, related the following observations:
The northern portion of Nebraska is favored by an abundance
of good quality water supplies, while the southern portion of the
State is favored with large bodies of high quality arable lands.
The in-state transfer of water from water-surplus areas to waterdeficit areas has great promise. Whereas many Western States have
all of their water supplies committed, Nebraska is in the enviable
position of having a substantial water supply still available for
development.
I know of no other Reclamation state which has such a favorable
balance of water and land resources. Some states may look long-

235
238

237
238

Id. at 222. For a more accurate description of the areas included sae
id. at 228-30.
Id. at 222-24. The study only mentions the need and suggests that it
be a topic for more comprehensive studies in the future.
Id. at 224. The proposals are set forth in the study, id. at 230-35.
Id. at 238.
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ingly to their neighbors or to neighboring counties to see any
possibility of meeting their water needs. Or they must hope for
some breakthrough in the realms of desalination or weather management.
Nebraska, on the other hand, has the potential of meeting its
foreseeable future water needs by careful management of in-state
supplies. I239am quite excited about Nebraska's opportunities in this
direction.
Although interbasin transfers appear feasible and desirable, the
question is whether the people of the state will accept the changes
necessary to carry them out. Certainly the citizens were aroused by
the legislative bills to permit such diversions in 1943, 1947 and 1953,
for each proposal was defeated. It is possible, however, that tradeoffs can now be arranged to make even the strongest opposition
quiescent.
Arguably, a shift in attitude is shown by the modified position of
the powerful Nebraska State Irrigation Association. In 1936 the
Association resolved that it was "[o]pposed to any change in the laws
of this state which would permit the diversion of the waters of any
watershed within the state to be used within another watershed."240
This position was reversed in 1948 when it was resolved that the
association work together to establish a transbasin diversion scheme
that would have the most benefit for all involved.
Having just one thought, that if it is true that a diversion law
is necessary, and we believe it is, that we all want to see a comprehensive plan to put into effect, and we believe the easiest and quickest way to accomplish that, and to avoid the strife that is bound
to arise over diversion, that such an early meeting and such an
early approach will be effective to a degree, at least, we may have
a bill introduced in which none of us are interested at all, or in
which all of us are opposed. That has happened before, so we are
proposing this resolution. It is an invitation, really, of nothing
more than trying to get together before a bill is introduced and
see how much common good we can write into that bill.241

Then in 1964, the president of the Association made the following comment as part of his address to the convention:
Another problem hindering water use in Nebraska is the Transbasin Diversion Law that is now in effect. This barrier to more
239 NEBRAsKA I=GIa. Ass'N., PROCEEDINGS OF

=HE

78TH AuAL. CONVENTION

76 (1970).
240 NEBRAsKA IRRIG. Ass'N., PRocEEINGs OF THE 44TH ANNuAL CONVENTION

162-63 (1936) (Resolution No. 3).
241 NEBRASKA IPuG. Ass'N., PSocEEmamS OF THE 56TH ANNuAL CONVENTION

121-22 (1948) (Resolution No. 9).
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efficient and wider water use must be corrected. A dog that will
stay in his manger to keep his bone is bound to die of thirst as
well as starvation. 242
There has been a similar, though less dramatic, transition in the
Nebraska Legislative Council. In 1944 the Council's Committee on
Water Diversion took a feeble stand when it determined that at
some future date there may be need for legislative action to facilitate transbasin diversion, but that at the time of its report, no
need for new legislation was indicated.248 Twenty-two years later
this position seemed virtually unchanged. The 1966 Committee on
Ground and Surface Water Conservation and Utilization suggested
that "[u]ltimately, programs might have to be seriously considered
which involved the transportation of water from some areas to
others. In this case, Nebraska should re-evaluate its present antidiversion policy. '244 Finally, in 1968 the Committee on Ground and
Surface Water concluded that:
1. The lack of authority for a transbasin diversion is a serious
impediment to the full development of a state's water resources.
2. Legislative permission for transbasin diversion should contain
adequate safeguards for the needs of the basin of origin for
the foreseeable future. This protection should not be so extensive, however, as to maintain and encourage the continued nonuse of surplus water. Some provision should be made for the
effective utilization of water which is surplus at the present time,
but which may later be necessary in the basin of origin.
3. Permission of transbasin diversion on a project-by-project basis
would repeatedly generate serious diversion among large segments of Nebraska population and possibly result in an inconsistent policy on part of the Legislature. It is considered preferable that any Legislative permission for transbasin diversion set
out the guidelines by which diversion may be accomplished and
thereafter leave specific cases to administrative decision. 245
One can merely speculate as to whether there will be a resurgence of the local opposition experienced in the past. Two relatively
recent surveys would seem to indicate that even though there is still
opposition to transbasin diversion a large majority of persons believe diversion should be permitted. The first survey was conducted
at the annual meeting of the South Central Pump Irrigator's Asso242 NEBRASKA

243

IRRIG. Ass'N., PROCEEDINGS OF

=E

72D ANNUAL

CONVENTION

11 (1964).
1944 REPORT 53-71.

244 NEBRAsKA LEG. COUNCIL, COMm. ON GROUND & SURFACE WATER CONSERVATION AND UTILIZATION, REPORT No. 150, at 11 (1966).
245 NEBRAsKA LEG. COUNCIL, COmm. ON GROUND & SURFACE WATER, REPORT

No. 265, at 18 (1968).
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ciation on February 16, 1970. Of the 80 to 85 persons attending the
meeting, 60 completed the questionaires. To the question "Do you
think Nebraska should change its present law so that water could
be diverted from one watershed to another for useful purposes?", 67
percent replied in the affirmative with the remainder replying in
the negative. 246 The fact that the persons surveyed were pump
rather than surface water irrigators might tend to discredit the survey except for the fact that many of the past arguments against
diversion were prompted by the fear that the "surplus" water was
needed for adequate groundwater recharge 247
The second survey, though less formal, indicated an even more
favorable reception to a rule change. Of the persons surveyed,
75
248
Of
percent thought transbasin diversion should be permitted.
course, this survey could also be discounted because it was taken

among landowners within the Tri-County Project.249 But in the past,
rather than being for diversion, this area has opposed it, 2 50 so

the survey may indicate a change of sentiment.
Many of the areas that refused to support past proposals would
be benefited by the conceptual water transfers which are now part
of the framework study of the State Water Plan. To take advantage
of this additional development, these areas may well change their
former position. 25 1 Furthermore, a great deal of effort is going into
the State Water Plan, and the planners are developing additional
areas only after they are convinced that existing and future inbasin
development will not be jeopardized:
In-basin development will have the highest priority for the next
25 years in Nebraska. We have to assure basins with water of full
development and any areas getting extra water will first have to
246

247

The questionnaire and a summary of the results can be found in an
undated memo to Dan Jones, Director, Water Resources Department.
A copy of this correspondence is on fie with the authors.
See discussion and accompanying notes supra pp. 104-06.

resources specialist, conducted the survey. It was reported in the

Omaha World Herald, March 21, 1970, at 14.
World Herald, March 21, 1970, at 14.
249 Tri-County (Central Neb. Pub. Power & Irrig. Dist.) was the entity
which in the mid-thirties started the whole diversion controversy
by trying to remove Platte River Water from the basin.
25o Most of the district's irrigable land is in Gosper and Phelps Counties
both of which voted against all the proposed diversion bills. See voter
distribution chart, appendix infra.
251 Compare the voter distribution chart and map, appendix infra., with
the conceptual transfer schemes found in NEBRAsKA SonL AN WATER
CoNsERvATiON CO~M'N., supra note 234, at 230-37.
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learn how to use, under adequate management, all present suplies can expect to get extra water [sic].252

The extensive plans and apparent protection may convince many
Nebraskans that they truely have nothing to lose and perhaps much
to gain by supporting diversion legislation.
Diversion will not be free of critics, however. Many persons
for one reason or another still have very strong feelings against it.
In fact, prior to the adoption of the Report on the Framework Study,
one individual appeared before a committee of the Soil and Water
Conservation Commission to request 2that all mention of interbasin
transfers be deleted from the report. 5
One must conclude that the circumstances are more conducive
for passage of a diversion bill than in the past. But, of course, success cannot be predicted with certainty. Much will depend on how
the anti-diversionists conduct their campaign. Not only will appeals
be made to anti-government and large project sentiments, but all
possible evidence will be presented to convince the citizenry that
there is no surplus water and that the state studies and predictions
are, at best, unreliable. On the other hand, those who feel strongly
that transbasin diversion is the answer to the state's growing water
problems may carry the day.
ADMINISTRATION-BASIN OF ORIGIN PROTECTION
If an enabling statute is adopted, the legislature cannot adequately deal with every request to transport water outside the
originating basin, and therefore it should delegate its authority.
Presumably, the Department of Water Resources would be called
upon to perform this function because of its present position as
administrator of the water allocation laws, many of which would
apply to interbasin transfers. All appropriators must apply to the
Department and be granted a permit before they can legally divert
water from a stream. 254 Like application must be made to change
points of diversion. 255 And appropriations are limited in their use
252

253
254
255

Lincoln Sunday Journal and Star, Sept. 13, 1970, at 2B. This statement
was made by Warren Fairchild, past Executive Secretary for the Neb.
Soil & Water Conservation Commission. After 13 years with the Commission, Mr. Fairchild is now with the Department of Interior,
Bureau of Reclamation. See, NEBRAsKA SoIL Am WATER CONSERVATION
COMM'N., supra note 234, at 227.
Minutes, Nebraska Soil &Water Conservation Comm'n., Jan. 12, 1971.
NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 46-233 to -245 (Reissue 1968).
Id.
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to the particular parcel of land described in the application.256 Thus,
even if the legislature would legalize interbasin transfers, there
could be no such transfer until an application was ified and approved
and a permit issued. Prior to approval or denial the applicant or
objectors may request and receive a hearing,2 57 and if the parties
are not in agreement with the final action taken by the Department,
2 58
they still have recourse to the Nebraska Supreme Court.
Before granting any permit the Department must determine that
the use is going to be "beneficial," 259 that "there is unappropriated
water in the source of supply named in the application, and if such
application and appropriation when perfected is not otherwise detrimental to the public welfare."260 This gives the Department wide
discretion in granting or denying permits. In the case of transbasin
diversion, this discretion may be too broad. The past bills, on the
other hand, were very limited in scope. The 1943 bill merely authorized the transbasin diversion of storage water. 261 The 1947 rendition provided that:
Where an irrigation ditch or canal is located on or near the
divide between the basins of two rivers of flowing streams, water
may be used from such ditch or canal to irrigate lands on either
side of the line dividing the watersheds of the rivers or streams,
but the lands in the basin of the river or stream from which the
water was originally taken shall have the prior right to use of
the water over lands outside such basin, regardless of priority of
2 62
appropriation.

Both of these provisions were principally designed for the TriCounty project. Tri-County uses mostly storage water, and main
supply canals follow the watershed divide. The 1953 proposal subordinated interbasin transfers to:
All appropriations now existing or hereafter granted within
the drainage basin and that only such natural flow and storage
water shall be deemed appropriated and used to irrigate such lands
as is available each day during the irrigation season in excess of
the daily requirements of those using water for domestic purposes
within the drainage basin of such stream and its tributaries. 263
All three of these bills sought to protect the areas of origin. This
area-of-origin protection, as seen in the California, Colorado and
256 Id.
257 NEB. Rsv. SmT. §§ 46-209, -235 (Reissue 1968).
258 NEm. REv. STAT. § 46-210 (Reissue 1968).

259 NEB. REv.
260 NE. REv.
261 L.B. 253,
262 L.B. 257,
263 L.B. 311,

STAT. § 46-229 (Reissue 1968).
STAT. § 46-235 (Reissue 1968).
56th Neb. Leg. Sess.

(1943).

60th Neb. Leg. Sess. (1947).
65th Neb. Leg. Sess. (1953).
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Texas schemes, will surely be the focal point of any transbasin diversion proposal of local, regional or national significance. 26 4
There is one additional method of protecting the future growth
of areas of origin which has not yet been discussed. The legislation
authorizing interbasin transfers could require the Department to
restrict the appropriative permits to a limited period of time. Just
prior to the expiration of the permit there would be an examination
of all the data, testimony, etc., which prompted the original grant
along with any other information that had subsequently become
relevant. It would then be determined whether the permit should
expire or be extended, with or without alteration; this determination would be subject to the same procedural safeguards as the
disposition of an original application. Several of the model water
codes require such a limitation on all water use permits.265 The
various acts provide for permit duration from 10 to 50 years. 266 But
any permit of limited duration is going to be criticized because it
may not provide adequate time for amortization of the initial project investment. One possibility would be to tie the length of duration of the permit to the time necessary to amortize the project
investment. The burden of proof on this issue would be on the
applicant, but quite often the amortization period would correspond
to the repayment schedule or the term of the government loan. This
proposal could also be used in conjunction with a fixed maximum
of perhaps 50 years.
Whatever statutory scheme is finally selected, it is going to be
not only desirable but politically essential to limit the discretion to
grant transbasin diversion permits. The present statutory criteria,
"beneficial use" and "not otherwise detrimental to the public welfare" is quite inadequate and needs to be bolstered by legislatively
enacted standards. 26 7 The following, not intended to be all inclusive,
268
are suggested:
264

See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 153.

265

E.g., MODEL

266

Id.
See Yeutter, supra note 84, and authorities cited therein. See also,
Johnson & Knippa, supra note 31, at 1060-61.
The basis for several of these criteria is N.C. GEw. STAT. § 162A-7C
(1964).

WATER USE ACT § 406 (1958)
(50 yr. max.); Maloney,
Ausness & Morris, The Model Water Code: Text and Commentary
§ 2.06, in Florida Water Research Center Publication No. 8 (undated,
unpublished draft on file with author) (20 yr. max.); A State Statute
to Provide Controls for Equitable Distribution of Water, 4 HAav. J.
LEGIs. 399 (1967) (10 yr. max.). See also IowA CODE ANN. § 455A.20

(Supp. 1971)
267
268

(10 yr. max.).

INTERBASIN TRANSFERS: NEBRASKA LAW-LEGEND 139
(1) The necessity of the proposed project to maximize state water
use;
(2) The feasibility269of the proposed project and its economic benefit-cost ratio;
(3) The magnitude and distribution of potential project benefits;
(4) The extent of the probable detriment to be caused by the proposed project to the present and potential beneficial use of
water in the affected area and the effect on present and potential water related interests;
(5) The feasibility and costs of alternative sources of supply for
the applicant and for the area of origin;
(6) Whether the proposal is consistent with the State Water Plan;
(7) Whether the proposed 270
project will promote the storage and
conservation of water;
(8) Whether the proposed project will have any beneficial or
detrimental ecological effects; 271
269

270

271

Marshall, The Evaluation of River Basin Development, 22 LAW &
CONT
WM.PROB. 237 (1957). See generally C. Howe &K. EAsTER, INTEBASn TRmSFr OF WAE (1971).
The consideration here should be broader than that in item number
(1), i.e., the question should not only include Nebraska's interests but
also those of downstream user states.
"The Platte is unique and extremely important. While a great percentage of wildlife and attractive woodlands in Nebraska are associated
with rivers and streams, the state's water laws do not adequately recognize these ecological values. Furthermore, some federal programs are
helping to finance degradation of streams.
"In this case, the Platte is threatened by the Mid-State Reclamation
Project.
n the spring of 1970, the potential threat of the Mid-State project
to the Platte River environment was brought to the attention of the
National Audubon Society. Since then, we have been studying the
ecology of tle area and investigating various aspects of the project.
"If the project is constructed and carried out according to current
plans, we believe that a drastic alteration in the river will take place.
Under the present preliminary operation plan for irrigation diversion,
the river will be dry for extensive periods and low most others.
'It follows that the dry river bed would grow up in weeds and
willows. Then, in order to maintain flood capacity, it would probably
be necessary to channelize the river and maintain it as an open ditch.
With the river dry and a lower water table adjacent to the river, the
wetlands and wet meadows would dry up. The islands would no
longer exist as such, and it would be economically feasible to bulldoze
the woodlands for more intensive cropland agriculture. Water pollution would be aggravated by reduced flow, and the the Platte River
would end up as a polluted ditch, its natural beauty and wildlife
destroyed." Klataske, For the Record-Platte in Danger, NEBRAsKAJune 1971, at 3.

LAND,
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(9) The extent to which the proposed diversion will facilitate
water 272
use corresponding to the state preference pronouncements;
(10) Whether the project, if approved, would jeopardize existing
compacts or decrees involving Nebraska and other states.
CONCLUSION

Regardless of the feasibility and desirability, the initial decision
whether to permit transbasin diversion must be made by the people
expressing their views through their elected representatives in the
Nebraska Legislature. To assist the public in formulating an intelligent opinion, impartial, well-publicized studies and hearings should
present relevant and adequate information about the risks and benefits. Unlike many situations involving technical matters, past experience indicates that both the merits and negative factors will be well
articulated by interest groups with substantial financial support.
To make available the opinions of those in a position of impartiality, persons at the University of Nebraska and government officials
should take more than a mere passive role. In other words, they
should not simply present data essential for decision making,
but they should explicitly state their opinions concerning the extent
to which the contemplated diversions are optimum.
272

Since an area-of-origin protection may be inconsistent with constitutional or statutory preference provisions, a diversion project which will
facilitate preferential use should be favored. The present Nebraska
preferences of water use are: 1. domestic; 2. agriculture; 3. industry.
NEB. CONST. art. XV, § 6; NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 46-204, -613 (Reissue
1968).
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APPENDIX
Voting Chart
L.B. 253
(1943)

L.B. 257
(1947)

L.B. 311
(1953)

Adams
Antelope
Arthur
Banner
Blaine

F
A
A
F
A

F
A
A
A
A

F
NV
A
A
A

Boone
Box Butte

A
A

A
A

NV
A

Boyd
Brown
Buffalo
Burt
Butler

F
F
A
F
A

NV
F
A
A
A

A
A
A
A
A

Cass

F

F

NV

Cedar
Chase
Cherry
Cheyenne
Clay
Colfax
Cuming

A
F
F
F
F
A
F

A
F
F
A
A
A
A

A
NV
A
A
A
A
A

Custer

A

A

A

Dakota
Dawes
Dawson
Deuel

A
A
A
A

A
A
A
A

A
A
A
A

Dixon

A

A

A

Dodge
Douglas*
Dundy
Fillmore
Franklin

A
A
F
F
F

A
F
F
A
F

A

Frontier

A

A

A

Furnas
Gage
Garden
Garfield
Gosper
Grant

F
A
A
A
A
A

F
F
A
A
A
A

F
NV
A
A
A
A

Greeley

A

A

F

NV
NV
F
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L.B. 253
(1943)

Hall
Hamilton
Harlan
Hayes
Hitchcock
Holt
Hooker
Howard
Jefferson
Johnson
Kearney
Keith
Keyapaha
Kimball
Knox
Lancaster**
Lincoln
Logan
Loup
McPherson
Madison
Merrick
Morrill
Nance
Nemaha
Nuckolls
Otoe
Pawnee
Perkins
Phelps
Pierce
Platte
Polk
Red Willow
Richardson
Rock
Saline
Sarpy
Saunders
Scotts Bluff
Seward
Sheridan
Sherman

A
F
F
F
F
F
A
A
F
A
F
A
F
F
A
F
A
A
A
A
F
A
F
A
F
F
F
A
F
A
F
A
F
F
A
F
F
F
A
A
F
F
A

L.B. 257
(1947)

A
A
F
F
F
NV
A
A
F
F
F
A
NV
A
A
F
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
F
F
F
F
F
A
A
A
A
F
F
NV
A
F
A
A
F
F
A

L.B. 311
(1953)

A
A
F
NV
NV
A
A
F
F
NV
F
A
A
A
A
F
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
NV
A
F
A
NV
NV
A
A
NV
A
F
NV
A
NV
NV
A
NV
A
A
A
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Sioux
Stanton
Thayer
Thomas
Thurston
Valley
Washington
Wayne
Webster
Wheeler
York

L.B. 253
(1943)
A
A
F
A
A
A
A
A
F
A
F

L.B. 257
(1947)
A
A
F
A
A
A
A
A
F
A
F

L.B. 311
(1953)
A
A
F
A
A
F
A
A
F
F
A

F-Voted For Interbasin Diversion
A-Voted Against Interbasin Diversion
NV-Not Voting
In each of the three instances the vote was taken on a resolution to kill.
Thus a legislator voting in favor of the resolution was in effect against interbasin diversion. This is reflected on the chart, i.e., those voting in favor of
the resolution are listed as "against."
*Since Douglas County has multiple representatives, if a majority of the
representatives voted "for" or "against' interbasin diversion the county
is charted as so voting. On L.B. 253 there were 5 votes "against" interbasin diversion, 1 vote "for," and 1 not voting. On L.B. 257 there were 4
votes "for" interbasin diversion and 3 votes "against." On L.B. 311 there
were 3 votes "for," 3 votes "against," and 1 not voting; thus on this
resolution Douglas County is not charted as voting in any manner.
* *Lancaster County also has multiple representatives and the same charting
mechanisms used for Douglas County was used for Lancaster. On L.B.
253 and L.B. 257 all representatives voted for interbasin diversion. On
L.B. 311, 2 representatives voted "for" and 1 voted "against."
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